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ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS
THE DISCURSIVE IMPACT OF TRANSNATIONAL ADVOCACY NETWORKS:
HOW AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL AND HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH
INFLUENCED THE MEDIA COVERAGE OF THE RWANDA GENOCIDE
by
Marilu Del Toro
Florida International University, 2009
Miami, Florida
Professor Clair Apodaca, Major Professor
Initial representations of the Rwanda genocide in the Western media were at best
inaccurate and at worst, stereotypical, citing African "tribal savagery" and "centuries-old
tribal hatred" as the reason for the mass killings. Two major human rights organizations,
Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, had the opportunity to correct media
portrayals and help shape the agenda for policymakers. The purpose of this study was to
take a critical look at media portrayals and discover whether these two nongovernmental
organizations played a role in influencing the coverage. An extensive media analysis of
three elite Western newspapers found that NGOs were the single largest source of
nuanced political explanations countering stereotypes of African "tribal warfare." Human
Rights Watch, in particular, played a pivotal role in sensitizing the media to the
genocide's character as a planned, politically motivated campaign.
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I: INTRODUCTION
Much has been written about the media coverage of the Rwanda genocide. When the
plane carrying Presidents Juvenal Habyarimana of Rwanda and Cyprien Ntariyamira of
Burundi was shot down on the night of 6 April 1994, the Western media began covering
the events that ensued in the small Central African country. As the days and weeks
passed, however, all major news outlets consistently missed the genocide story, reporting
instead about fighting between warring factions, the resumption of a three-year-old civil
war, and in the worst cases, about the eruption of "tribal hatreds" that were presumably
deep-seated among Rwandans and therefore taken for granted in the country's bloodsoaked political history. The U.N. Security Council deliberated behind closed doors
about what to do, and its talks centered on obtaining a ceasefire and not on stopping the
killing of civilians. Security Council members - the U.S., U.K., and France chief among
them - persisted in treating the situation as a traditional war, ignoring the evidence that
much more than a traditional war was taking place. Acknowledging the mass slaughter
of civilians - the targeted killings of men, women, and children who had no direct
involvement with the two warring sides - would have confronted them with the moral
and legal obligation to intervene, as stated in the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. Presented, therefore, with the opportunity to live
up to the U.N. promise of "never again," the Security Council chose instead to sit on its
hands, failing to take action during a critical period when hundreds of thousands were
being killed. The absence of accurate reporting created a media atmosphere that, while
not directly complicit, lent itself to the Security Council's inaction.
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How did Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, the two largest
international human rights nongovernmental organizations, influence this media
coverage? Even though human rights international law is addressed to states, many
scholars have noted that NGOs have play an increasingly important role in standard- and
agenda-setting in the promotion of human rights, serving as an "international conscience"
and influencing governments to honor their international law commitments. At the heart
of NGO effectiveness is the strategic mobilization of information. Human rights
advocacy NGOs are organized around the principle of reporting accurate information to
key decision makers to elicit a response promoting or protecting human rights.
As the genocide raged in Rwanda, Amnesty International and Human Rights
Watch had the opportunity to use the media as a platform to reach policymakers and
influence public opinion in favor of taking action to stop the summary killings. This
thesis will explore whether these organizations attempted to influence the media
discourse about the genocide. Conducting this analysis will help to determine whether
NGOs were effective in their strategic use of information and whether engaging the
media can and should be prioritized higher during a human rights crisis campaign. On a
theoretical level, it is also important to focus on nongovernmental organizations because
the realist perspective claims that nonstate actors are irrelevant in the international
system, where the true players are states in pursuit of their rational interests. To show
whether other actors are effective in the international system is to contradict a
longstanding and powerful argument in political theory. It gives these actors their proper
due in international relations theory and portrays the international system in an accurate
light.
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Rwanda Genocide: Summary

of Events

The Rwanda genocide began on the night between 6 April and 7 April 1994, after
President Juvenal Habyarimana's plane was shot down in mysterious circumstances the
evening of 6 April. Ethnic tensions between the majority Hutu ethnic group and the
minority Tutsi ethnic group had been simmering for months prior to the shootdown,
which served as the catalyst for the violence that ensued. Broadcasting company Radio
Television Libres de Milles Collines accused Tutsis of targeting the President and used
the incident as a pretext to begin inciting Hutus to take revenge on Tutsis.
Tutsis had emerged as an upper class in Rwanda over time, but the two groups
coexisted in relative peace when German and Belgian colonizers arrived in the 19th
century. The Belgians formalized the racial system in 1933, issuing identity cards that
identified citizens by ethnic group or "tribe" (Shattuck, 2003, p. 28). Tutsis made up
approximately 15 percent of the population. During the struggle for independence in the
1950s and 1960s, racial tensions were exacerbated by a Hutu revolutionary movement
that aimed to "throw off the shackles" of colonial domination. Many Tutsis were killed
or driven to leave the country (Shattuck, pp. 29-30). In 1987, Tutsi exiles formed the
Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) in neighboring Uganda, and in 1990, the RPF began
launching guerrilla attacks into Rwanda from their base in Uganda. Tutsi forces of the
PRF continued to pose a threat to the Hutu-led government of Habyarimana. The French
government backed Habyarimana's administration, selling arms to Rwanda throughout
the early 1990s (Shattuck, p. 30). This was a difficult period for Tutsis in the country,
who were under pressure and scrutiny from the Rwandan government. On 4 August
1993, President Habyarimana finally signed an agreement to share power with the RPF
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and allow Tutsi refugees to return (Shattuck, p. 31). This "capitulation" served as a
catalyst for the furor that eventually led to Habyarimana's shootdown and the widespread
killing of Rwandan Tutsis and moderate Hutus at the hands of extremist Hutus in the
army, police force, and civilian population.
One former U.S. diplomat estimated the loss of human life at 800,000, which
occurred mostly in a space of just 14 weeks (Shattuck, 2003, p. 31). Amnesty
International estimates that as many as one million lives were lost during the Rwandan
genocide and its aftermath. Not only did the killings constitute one of the worst human
rights crises in human history, they were also accompanied by other horrifying cases of
torture and rape ("Rwanda: Gacaca Tribunals Must Conform," 2002). As many as two
million people were forced to leave their homes and became refugees living in precarious
conditions throughout the country and in bordering states.
According to John Shattuck, who was U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for
Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs at the time, the Rwandan genocide did not take
the United States or the world by surprise. The ongoing conflict and extremist hatred that
had been building up for years was also accompanied by occasional waves of killings. In
April 1993, a U.N. special rapporteur warned that "'a mechanism for civilian populations
against massacres should be immediately set up in terms of both prevention and
intervention"' (Shattuck, 2003, p. 32).
Still, the U.N.'s lumbering bureaucracy had no built-in mechanism to take
immediate action on this warning from the special rapporteur. Shattuck says the United
States also repeatedly denied appeals to bolster the U.N. peacekeeping troops already on
the ground in Rwanda for fear that there would be a repeat of the Somalia "incident" that
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had occurred the year before, when U.S. troops from a peacekeeping mission had been
very publicly attacked and dragged through the streets of that African country.
Commanded by General Romeo Dallaire of Canada, the U.N. peacekeeping
troops had a very limited mandate and could not use force to disarm paramilitary groups
(33). Soon after the onset of the genocide, Belgium withdrew its troops from the U.N.
peacekeeping force because 10 Belgian soldiers attempting to protect the Rwandan prime
minister were tortured and killed by Hutu extremists. On 21 April, instead of reinforcing
U.N. peacekeepers, the U.N. Security Council passed a resolution disbanding the force by
almost 90 percent and ordering the withdrawal of all but 270 soldiers from Rwanda,
although the number of peacekeepers actually deployed was never lower than 456
(Kuperman, 2001, 42). On 17 May, the U.N. Security Council finally passed a
resolution authorizing a larger peacekeeping force of 5,500 troops to enter Rwanda.
However, the process of mustering the troops proved time-consuming and ineffectual.
On 22 June, France sought and obtained approval from the Security Council to intervene
unilaterally in Rwanda in a humanitarian mission called Operation Turquoise (Kuperman,
p. 44). The Rwandan Patriotic Front believed France was intervening to help its former
ally and protested French intervention; but ultimately, the French presence served to
protect some Tutsi civilians throughout the countryside who were still at risk of slaughter.
By 18 July 1994, the Tutsi-led RPF declared a cease-fire, having gained control of
the country. Most of the killings had already been committed, and the government-led
campaign was stopped. The international community had done virtually nothing to stop
the genocide. The lack of response in the face of such widespread slaughter raises the
question of perceptions. How was the conflict perceived? What was the prevalent
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discourse about Rwanda? Were there flaws in the discourse that can help explain the
inaction? The research problem consists of determining whether the media coverage was
flawed and failed to convey the true nature and scale of the genocide, Amnesty
International and Human Rights Watch attempted to correct inaccurate media portrayals,
and these organizations were effective in changing/shaping the media discourse.
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II: LITERATURE REVIEW
Misrepresentations in the Western Media
Both scholars and reporters have examined and criticized the way the Rwanda crisis was
reported throughout its most critical months, from April through July 1994. One of the
first inquiries into the Rwanda genocide, The InternationalResponse to Conflict and
Genocide: Lessons from the Rwanda Experience, Early Warning and Genocide -

published by the Steering Committee of the Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to
Rwanda - concluded that "the Western media's failure to report adequately on the
genocide in Rwanda possibly contributed to international indifference and inaction, and
hence the crime itself" (1996, para 36).
Most major Western media outlets covered the plane crash and the deaths of the
two presidents. Some then covered the gunfire and killings that followed in the
subsequent days, quickly turning the attention to the evacuation of foreign nationals. In
The Media and the Rwanda Genocide, Anne Chaon, a reporter editing the Rwanda stories
at the Paris desk of Agence France Presse at the time, writes that "newspapers generally
gave the same amount of space to the evacuation as to the massacres" (Chaon, 2007,
"Who Failed in Rwanda," para 17). Indeed, many foreign reporters also evacuated the
country at this time, so that for most of April, "there were no more than 10 to 15 reporters
in the country at any time" (Thompson, 2007, Introduction, para 19). In late April, when
news reports using the word "genocide" finally began to emerge, media attention was
then distracted by the refugee camps erected at Benaco and Ngara. Later, when France
sought and obtained U.N. Security Council support to intervene unilaterally in Rwanda
through Operation Turquoise, the media returned in greater numbers to Rwanda, but once
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again they under-reported the genocide, covering instead the military intervention,

France's strategy, and the Rwandese reaction to France's presence. "'The result,"' writes
Chaon, "'was that the reality of the genocide was, once again, submerged in too much
information"' (Thompson, 2007, Introduction, para 21). Finally, in mid-July, as the RPF
worked toward its final push to take control of the country, hundreds of thousands of
Rwandan refugees flooded into Goma, Zaire, and the media flocked to the refugee camps
to cover an obvious humanitarian crisis, once again missing or submerging the genocide
story. Chaon offers this explanation of the media interest in the refugee crisis:
"Everybody ran to Goma because the story there was so easy to cover. After
months of genocide, the issue of good guys and bad guys disappeared completely.
The enemy was cholera, but no political issue surrounded cholera in the camps. It
seemed as if journalists were more comfortable covering cholera than genocide"

(Chaon, 2007, "Who Failed in Rwanda," para 35).
Consistently, the subject of the genocide was sidelined by other events. Because it was
carried out so quickly and in such a short time period, not reporting it accurately or
enough meant that public opinion mostly missed it.
The Joint Evaluation report described the failure of the Western media to
accurately portray the events occurring in April 1994:
"The initial reporting in both The [London] Times and New York Times had
appallingly misleading reports: the downed plane was a result of a Tutsi attempt
to destroy the Hutu leadership in Rwanda and Burundi; "mobs" or a troop
rampage killed the Rwandese Premier and 10 Belgian soldiers; anarchy (not
interahamwe with roadblocks) reigned in the streets; "rival tribal factions waged

vicious street battles". On all the critical points, these early reports were wrong.
An interpretive piece in The New York Times on 9 April explained the events as a
genocidal orgy (rather than a systematic organized genocide), a continuation of a
centuries-old feud.
[...I
"US television coverage and the CNN erred on the side of vagueness, generally
referring to 'unspeakable atrocities,' and 'ethnic violence,' but picked up the
theme of tribal or mutual ethnic slaughter. It would not be until 7 May that ABC
correspondent Ron Allen suggested that the events were not a product of
spontaneous tribal violence, but were a premeditated political act intended as a
final solution (Joint Evaluation, "International Reponse," 1996, para 30)."
The media's general under-reporting of the slaughter was consistently coupled with
factual errors.
Scholar Alan Kuperman (2007) also analyzed multiple Western media outlets in
the months following the start of the genocide and identified four major errors in the
coverage. The first, writes Kuperman, was that the media believed what was occurring
was primarily a civil war and not genocide. He cites editorials and reports in media as
disparate as The London Times, Belgium's De Standaard,and Radio France
International, all of which emphasized the cease-fire or the warring parties, eclipsing the
planned aspect of the massacres. According to Kuperman, the second mistake was
reporting that the violence was diminishing when it was, in fact, growing. Major media
such as The New York Times and Le Monde reported a slackening in the violence in midApril. Reports from Le Monde and The Guardianthen stopped altogether after April 18,
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apparently because most foreign reporters had evacuated. The silence in Le Monde lasted
four days and for The Guardian,seven. Far from conveying the urgency of the situation,

the report that violence was declining and then the paucity of coverage seemed to indicate
a lack of news, when this was the time, we know now, that most of the killings occurred.
The third mistake was the misreporting of the death count, particularly in the early weeks
of the genocide. Kuperman notes that estimates were often too low, grossly
misrepresenting the extent of the carnage. Only in the third week of the killing did the
scope of the hundreds of thousands of victims emerge. Finally, Kuperman argues that
Western news organizations made the mistake of focusing almost exclusively on the

capital city of Kigali, failing to represent the national scope of the genocide. It was only
on April 25, notes Kuperman, that The New York Times reported the methodical killing of
Tutsi across the countryside.
Allan Thompson, who edited The Media and the Rwanda Genocide (2007), one of
the most comprehensive examinations up to date of the media's role in the genocide,
explains that at least some of the problems with the media coverage could be owed to the
logistical challenges of reporting on a country caught in a civil war. Once the President's
plane was shot down, getting into Rwanda was far from straightforward. At the time of
the shootdown, there were only two foreign journalists in Rwanda. Those who traveled
there to cover the conflict after the plane crash had to find alternate ways of getting into
the country because the airport was closed to commercial flights. Some Nairobi-based

journalists

managed entry into the country by traveling from Uganda with the Rwandan

Patriotic Front. The BBC's Mark Doyle was able to persuade a World Food Programme
aid worker to allow him to fly in with him to Kigali in a plane that was then going to be
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used to evacuate foreigners. Most American reporters were ordered to leave because the
situation was considered too unsafe for them (Thompson, p. 17). Mobile phones did not
have the reach they do now, and news media organizations considered it too risky to send
an expensive satellite uplink into the country. A satellite uplink was only provided in late
May, when the RPF had gained control of the airport (Thompson, p. 17).
Compounding the problem was the West's general lack of interest in the situation.
Journalist Anne Chaon has noted that the big international stories at the time were Bosnia
and elections in South Africa. "The conflict in Bosnia had started in 1992 and in
Yugoslavia in 1991," writes Chaon. "The genocide in Rwanda would have had to have
lasted for two or three years to garner as much media attention as Bosnia" (Chaon, 2007,
"Who Failed Rwanda" para 18). O.J. Simpson coverage dominated the airwaves in the
United States, and in France, the death of Brazilian formula 1 driver Ayrton Seyna also
received much coverage. As Allan Thompson has remarked, "The Rwanda genocide, as
a news event, simply did not break through" (Thompson, 2007, Introduction, para 17).
For those reporters who were covering Rwanda, there was also a great deal of
confusion on the ground. In fact, Chaon has argued that the media, and not individual
journalists, failed Rwanda. The journalists who were there, says Chaon, were committed
to getting the story and to testifying to the killings. She offers this explanation for the
inaccuracies:
"Most

journalists are not experts

in genocide. Many of them - myself included-

arrived in Rwanda with very little knowledge of the country. So, it was tempting,
especially at the beginning, to speak of the civil war, of these massacres as a
perverse return of a civil war, and to link these massacres to previous massacres
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since 1959. We failed to understand that the killing was something totally new,

that this was not a continuity of what had happened before (Chaon, 2007, "Who
Failed in Rwanda," para 23)."
Chaon explains that, coupled with the Western media's interest in other news stories such
as O.J. Simpson and Bosnia and overly cautious editors back at the newsdesks, the media
in a general sense got the story wrong, but not because individual journalists were not
dedicated to reporting the truth.
One vivid illustration of this confusion on the ground among journalists is evident
in an account offered by BBC reporter Mark Doyle, one of the very few foreign

journalists who stayed

in Rwanda during most of the genocide. Ironically, his account,

which was published in The Media and the Rwanda Genocide, was meant to dispute, to
some degree, the claim that the media missed the genocide story. Doyle, who took
considerable risks to his life to report on what was occurring, reproduces parts of the
stories he filed at the time, arguing that as early as the second week, he was already
making clear references to government-backed massacres of ethnic Tutsis and Hutu
opponents of the Habyarimana regime. What emerges from the stories he reproduces,
however, is that the news of the civil war almost always led his reports, with descriptions
of the killings buried or sandwiched midway through descriptions of RPF vs. government
army positions or advances. The following is one example:
"The battle for Kigali continues. Small arms, automatic weapons and grenades
are being used as rebel and government forces struggle for advantage. On
Tuesday (April 12), the U.N. commander in Rwanda said the rebel forces were
not encountering strong resistance. However, there was heavy fighting at dawn
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on Wednesday. The conflict began when the president's plane was shot down
seven days ago. The president'ssupporters blamed rival tribaland ethnic groups
and the massacresof civilians began. Tens of thousands ofpeople were killed
and hundreds of thousands displaced by the unrest. Now the fighting has a more

military aspect with two highly trained armies attacking each other. The rebels
say they are fighting to restore order...." (My emphasis) (Doyle, 2007, "Reporting
the Genocide," para 34)
Doyle clearly mentions the massacre of civilians, but only after beginning the story with
the civil war and continuing with the civil war. In what goes on to be a much longer
story, the massacre of "tens of thousands of people" only receives two lines. Buried as it
is between the language of war, it is easy to interpret the references to the massacres as
casualties of war, as opposed to a deliberate killing of civilians.
A second example shows a similar pattern:
"The fighting is fierce. Mortar and heavy-calibre automatic weapons were heard
at various times throughout the night. Tens of thousands ofpeople have been
killed in the last week in clashes, which have involved tribal militiasat least as
much as regulargovernment and rebel troops. The capital of Rwanda is
anarchic. U.N. peacekeepers have failed to stop the fighting but are trying at least
to organize a meeting between the two sides." (My emphasis) (Doyle, 2007,
"Reporting the Genocide," para 40)
Once again, Doyle focuses most of his writing on the war aspect of the conflict. Even
when he mentions the tens of thousands of people who have been killed, he says they
were killed in "clashes," which connotes mutual warfare or war casualties as opposed to
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the systematic slaughter of civilians. As he reverts to the civil war, he loses the
opportunity to elaborate on the people who have been singled out to be killed.
Perhaps wanting to convey a sense that this was more than just savage
tribalism and that a deliberate political maneuver was at play, in later stories, Doyle refers
to the victims as "ethnic or political opponents of the late president" (Doyle, 2007,
"Reporting the Genocide," para 54). But this terminology, used again amidst descriptions
of war, fails to capture the merciless nature of the killings, which included women,
children, and infants. While calling them "political opponents" offers a more nuanced
reading of the situation, it also does not capture the thousands of people who had no
political involvement in the government or the opposition and were targeted for killing.
The genocide was very effectively covered by the civil war, even for dedicated reporters
such as Doyle who were witnessing events firsthand.
Still, the inaccuracy of the reporting was not owed simply to a failure to
understand the genocide as separate from the civil war. Linda Melvem has described
how the international media inaccurately and stereotypically portrayed the killings in
Rwanda as "tribal violence" (Melvern, 2007, "Missing the Story," para 3). An
investigative journalist herself, Melvern is perhaps one of the most vocal critics of the
media's failure to accurately capture the situation in Rwanda in the spring of 1994. She
notes that the use of this cliche "dominated the early reports on the genocide" and that it
lent itself to an interpretation of events as "uncontrollable tribal savagery about which
nothing could be done" (Melvern, 2007, "Missing the Story," para 3). Melvem cites a
New York Times editorial that appeared in mid-April and describes Rwanda as a "'failed
central African nation-state with a centuries-old history of tribal warfare and deep distrust
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of outside intervention"' as well as a country in an "'uncontrollable spasm of lawlessness
and terror"' (Thompson, 2007, "Missing the Story," para 3).
Romeo Dallaire, the Commander of the United Nations Assistance Mission for
Rwanda (UNAMIR) on the ground during the genocide, echoes this criticism in the
chapter he contributed to The Media and the Rwanda Genocide. Comparing the coverage
of Rwanda to the coverage of the conflict in Bosnia, which was occurring at the same
time, he makes the following observation:
"In Yugoslavia, the problems were portrayed as long-standing divisions that
educated people had debated. It was religious and ethnic conflict, something
studied and analyzed. As such, we brought in new terms, like 'ethnic cleansing'
to describe Yugoslavia. In Rwanda, it was just a bunch of tribes going at each
other, like they always do. Rwanda was black. Yugoslavia was white European."

(Dallaire, 2007, "The Media Dichotomy," para 14)
The depiction of Rwanda as a country in the grips of yet another manifestation of ageless
tribal differences was not only inaccurate and misleading, but it also furthered the
agendas of the permanent members of the U.N. Security Council, who did not want to
intervene. As Thompson has noted, the inaccurate portrayals "served to help the cause of
those foot-draggers who did not want to get involved" (Thompson, 2007, Introduction,
para 19).

Human Rights Advocacy and the Media
Given the prevalence of misinformation in the media, international human rights
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) such as Amnesty International and Human
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Rights Watch had an opportunity to correct the facts and offer well-documented evidence
that something

more

than just spontaneous tribal killings and civil war were underway.

Various scholars have highlighted the importance of the media in the work of
advocacy NGOs. Ron, Ramos, and Rodgers, who have studied Amnesty's and Human
Rights Watch's use of the media as an advocacy tool, have noted that "the tight link
between news releases and the media is integral to their work" (2005, p. 572). In
interviews the three authors conducted, one Human Rights Watch senior manager said
that their job was to shape public debates, often "'seizing moments of public attention usually whatever is in the news - to make human rights points"' (2005, p. 573). In fact,
through an analysis of human rights coverage in key Western rmedia as well as an
analysis of the press releases and backgrounder reports published by Amnesty, Ron,
Ramos and Rodgers found that "there is evidence of reciprocal causality between the
media and Amnesty press releases" (2005, p. 573). In other words, not only does the
news affect Amnesty's country reporting and advocacy efforts, but the inverse is also
true: Amnesty's press releases affect the news.
In their own descriptions of what they do, both Amnesty and Human Rights
Watch have mentioned the importance of the media to their work. In the "Who We Are"
section of its website, Human Rights Watch notes that it is "known for its accurate factfinding, impartial reporting, effective use of media, and targeted advocacy" ("Who We
Are," para 2). The organization also states that it "publishes more than 100 reports and
briefings on human rights conditions in some 80 countries, generating extensive coverage
in local and international media." In Amnesty's "International Statute," which can be
found on its website, the organization notes that its mission "is to undertake research and
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action focused on preventing and ending grave abuses of these rights" ("Amnesty's
International Statute," para 1). In the same statute, under the "Methods" section,
Amnesty states that it "seeks to expose human rights abuses accurately, quickly and

persistently," and that to do that, its "findings are publicized, and members, supporters,
and staff mobilize public pressure on governments and others to stop the abuses"
("Amnesty's International Statute," para 2)
Scholar Morton Winston has remarked on the importance of the media in
Amnesty's work. Winston explains that Amnesty has two audiences for human rights
news: elite persons of influence and a mass audience of citizens. "In order to reach the
latter audience," writes Winston, "Al, like other human rights NGOs, must rely mainly
on the mass media as conveyors of their information" (Winston, 2001 p. 37). Winston
also notes that both Amnesty and Human Rights Watch "still rely mainly on the print
media to disseminate their information" (Winston, p. 38).

The Discursive Impact of Transnational Advocacy Networks
Two scholars who have noted the importance among NGOs of the strategic use of
information and setting international rights agendas are Margaret Keck and Kathryn

Sikkink (1998a, 1998b). Keck and Sikkink have identified and studied the unique
phenomenon of both non-state and state actors working together across national
boundaries to pursue a norm-based cause. They have called the aggregate of these
linkages "transnational advocacy networks," and their findings have become the
foundation of numerous investigations into the workings of transnational campaigns.
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According to Keck and Sikkink, these provisional linkages of cooperation
between state and non-state actors are advocacy networks because "they are organized to
promote causes, principled ideas, and norms, and they often involve individuals
advocating policy changes that cannot be easily linked to a rationalist understanding of
'interests"' (1 998a, pp. 8-9). Their primary function is not to promote the rationalist
interests of particular states but rather norm-based interests. Actors in these networks
include international and domestic nongovernmental research and advocacy
organizations; local social movements; foundations; the media; churches, trade unions,
consumer organizations, and intellectuals; parts of regional and international
intergovernmental organizations; and parts of the executive and/or parliamentary
branches of governments. Keck and Sikkink use the word "network" - and not other
terms that have emerged in international relations theory such as "global civil society" or
"global community" - to emphasize the horizontal, voluntary, and reciprocal way the
actors involved in this type of activism relate to each other and the central role played by
communication and information exchange in their interactions.
One of their key assertions is that transnational advocacy networks gain influence
by "serving as alternative sources of information" (2002, p. 95). The legitimacy of these
groups comes from access - from obtaining information directly from the victims of the
rights violations (who might not otherwise be heard). When transnational advocacy
networks have this information, they engage in "framing" and "venue shopping."
Framing is the act of providing a meaning for an event or occurrence. The authors base
their concept of "framing" on the definition of "frame alignment" offered by David
Snow: "'By rendering events or occurrences meaningful, frames function to organize
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experience and guide action, whether individual or collective"' (Keck & Sikkink, 2002,
p. 95). Because they are often actively opposed to more powerful actors who also have
the ability to interpret events and impose meaning, how transnational advocacy networks

frame an issue - and whether they are successful in achievingframe resonance, or
influencing broader understandings of an issue - will determine their success in being
persuasive (Keck & Sikkink, p. 95). Through the strategic use of information, they alter
the value contexts within which states make policies.
Transnational advocacy networks also strategically engage in venue shopping,
which is "seeking the most favorable arenas in which to fight their battles" (Keck &
Sikkink, 1997, p. 217). Unlike social movements, which tend to be grassroots, massoriented, and popularly based, transnational networks normally involve a small cadre of
activists engaged in elite politics. "The kinds of pressure and agenda politics in which
they engage rarely involve mass mobilization, except at key moments, although the
people whose cause they espouse may engage in mass protest" (Keck & Sikkink, 2002, p.
95). Their purpose is to influence decision makers in key positions of power with the
purpose of bringing about a change in a state's behavior or a change in international law.
While their actions might sometimes be aimed at doing both - at provoking a mass
reaction as well as a policy change at the state level - their focus is always on influencing
decisionmakers. "The strategic deployment of information," write Keck and Sikkink,
"may involve mobilization; more often it involves lobbying, targeting key elites and
feeding useful material to well-placed insiders" (1997, p. 236). Transnational advocacy
networks differ from social movements in that their "main activity ... is collecting
credible information and deploying it strategically at carefully selected sites" (Keck &
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Sikkink, 1997, p. 226). (In this sense, Amnesty is both a social movement and a
tr snational advocacy network because of its mass membership and its lobbying of
elites.) Similarly, transnational advocacy networks are often activated through a process
that Keck and Sikkink have called "the boomerang effect," which is a type of venue
shifting. The boomerang effect occurs when channels of participation are blocked
domestically to civil society, and NGOs or social movement groups move into the
international arena to seek redress. They communicate with NGOs in other states or
international NGOs who then pressure their own governments or intergovernmental
organizations to bring their influence down on the violating government (1998a, pp. 12-

13).
For Keck and Sikkink, recognizing that information is the primary weapon of
transnational advocacy networks is not enough to understand how they work. For this
reason, they have developed a typology of tactics to explain how the members of
transnational advocacy networks collaborate with each other in pursuit of their common
advocacy goals. These tactics are 1) information politics, or the ability to quickly and
credibly generate politically usable information and move it to where it will have the
most impact; 2) symbolic politics, or the ability to call upon symbols, actions, or stories
that make sense of a situation for an audience that is frequently far away; 3) leverage
politics, or the ability to call upon powerful actors to affect a situation where weaker
members of a network are unlikely to have influence; and 4) accountability politics, or
the effort to hold powerful actors to their previously stated policies or principles (Keck&

Sikkink, 1998a, p. 16).
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In addition, Keck and Sikkink identify stages of network influence, such as: 1)
issue creation and agenda setting 2) influence on discursive positions of states and
international organizations 3) influence on institutional procedures 4) influence on policy
changes in target actors and 5) influence on state behavior. They specifically speak of
these as "stages of influence" because they believe that some of these steps precede
others. For example, a discursive change (a state admitting for the first time to its
obligation to respect human rights) is likely to precede a change in policy (Keck &

Sikkink, 1998a, p. 25).
Another scholar who agrees on many points with Keck and Sikkink and has
devoted considerable study toward explaining transnational, norm-based advocacy is
Thomas Risse. Risse prefers to use the term "transnational civil society," as opposed to
"transnational advocacy networks." Unlike Keck and Sikkink, who include state actors
and intergovernmental organizations in transnational advocacy networks, Risse focuses
on those groups that "tend to aim for broader goals based on their conceptions of what
constitutes the public good" (Risse, 2000, p. 7). Like all civil society, these are "only
groups that are not governments or profit-seeking national entities" (Risse, p. 7).
Transnational civil society may take a variety of forms, from a complex coalition of
various nongovernmental organizations to one international nongovernmental
organization with members or chapters across several countries. Like Keck and Sikkink,
Risse points to the importance of norms/values as the main purpose of transnational civil
society.
Also like Keck and Sikkink, Risse maps the different stages that transnational
civil society passes through as it moves to attain its goals. He bases his theory on a series

21

of case studies of human rights campaigns. According to Risse, Phase I is the stage of
Repression and Activation of Transnational Civil Society. This occurs when a repressive
act by the government drives domestic civil society within the country to seek
international allies. Here Risse borrows the "boomerang effect" from Keck and Sikkink
to explain this dynamic.
Phase 2 is the stage of Norms Denial. During this period, the violating
government and transnational civil society are locked in a battle of meaning, with
transnational civil society groups trying to create the issue and place it on the
international human rights agenda. Transnational groups begin lobbying
intergovernmental organizations and Western states, trying to sway the perceptions of
both public opinion and governments (Risse, 2000, p. 193). The violating governments
deny the charges of human rights abuses and moreover, claim that the interventions by
the transnational groups are an illegal interference in the country's internal affairs (Risse,

p. 194).
Risse identifies additional stages of transnational civil society influence, but
because the focus of this study is the effects of transnational advocacy on discourse, the
first two phases of Risse's theory are the most relevant here. What is important is that all
three scholars - Keck, Sikkink and Risse - identify a stage during which human rights
advocacy NGOs engage in a battle over meaning.

Importance of Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch
In their investigation of transnational advocacy networks, Keck and Sikkink underline the
importance of nongovernmental organizations. There may be other actors, such as
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members of the media, intellectuals, and even government or intergovernmental officials

in transnational advocacy networks, but nongovernmental organizations are often
considered the "core" actors:

"...international and domestic nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) play a
central role in most advocacy networks, usually initiating actions and pressuring
more powerful actors to take positions. NGOs introduce new ideas, provide

information, and lobby for policy changes." (Keck & Sikkink, 1998b, p. 92)
NGOs are the motors of transnational advocacy networks and kick-start them into action.
They are also the groups most closely identified with the victims and possibly with the
greatest moral authority to speak on behalf of them.
In fact, throughout most of their book, Activists Beyond Borders, Keck and
Sikkink (2002) emphasize the pivotal role NGOs played in the emergence of
transnational advocacy networks. The precursor to today's human rights network which currently consists of hundreds of NGOs as well as IGOs such as the UN Council of
Human Rights and the Organization of American States' Inter-American Commission of
Human Rights - were the abolition and anti-footbinding movements of the

1 9 th

century.

Keck and Sikkink offer a detailed summary of the history of these movements,
acknowledging that they were propelled by civil society organizations, many of which
were based on religious principle. Transnational advocacy networks began to emerge in
the 1970s and 1980s, when human rights organizations began to form coalitions and
strong communication networks. Links were formed with domestic organizations in
countries experiencing human rights violations as well as with intergovernmental
organizations, foundations, and government representatives who were interested in
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espousing the human rights cause. Communications information technology such as
faxes, computers, and email helped to strengthen these communication flows. The role of
NGOs in this process was foundational. They continue to play a key role today. NGOs
often provide IGOs with much of the information they use to take action. Former
director of the UN Center for Human Rights Theo C. Van Boven, once noted that 85
percent of the information the Center used to carry out its work was derived from NGOs
(2002, p. 96). Keck and Sikkink also note that in the case of Argentina in the 1970s, and
Mexico in the 1980s and 1990s, NGOs were often the trailblazers in gathering
information and pushing for action against human rights abuses:
"NGOs documented violations and raised global concern about them. Later,
international and regional organizations produced reports building upon early
NGO investigations. NGOs also provided the information that served as the basis
for altered governmental policies (2002, pp. 116-117)."
Keck and Sikkink add that, in Argentina and Mexico, "foreign governments placed
pressure on human rights violators only after nongovernmental actors had identified,
documented and denounced human rights violations and had pressured foreign
governments to become involved" (2002, p. 117). Indeed, in the Boomerang Pattern that
Keck and Sikkink offer to explain the way in which NGOs link internationally with other
organizations, the primary initiators of action are domestic NGOs, who seek redress from
their international counterparts, who then pressure IGOs or other governments. The
importance of nongovernmental organizations in human rights advocacy is undeniable.
For this reason, Keck and Sikkink's findings are relevant for looking at the
actions of Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, which are two very
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important actors in the human rights transnational advocacy network. While

Keck and

Sikkink's theory does not limit transnational advocacy to NGOs - and in fact, their
theory goes beyond the NGOs to point to the important role played increasingly by
governments, foundations, individuals and IGOs - their typology of tactics applies to
Amnesty and Human Rights Watch as two key actors of the human rights network.
Moreover, Amnesty and Human Rights Watch enjoy a distinctive position within
the field. Due to its budget, size, global reach and apparent impact, Amnesty
International is arguably the largest human rights nongovernmental organization in the
world. Various scholars have studied Amnesty's impact on intergovernmental
organizations (IGOs), particularly the most important political IGO, the United Nations.
One of Amnesty's longstanding strategies has been to provide the U.N. with detailed
information on human rights violations. Helena Cook, for example, has studied
Amnesty's contributions to the U.N. in standard-setting, strengthening U.N. mechanisms
and procedures (including the establishment of the High Commissioner for Human
Rights), and raising country situations at the U.N. Commission on Human Rights, which
has now been replaced by the U.N. Human Rights Council (Welch, 2001, p. 88).
William Korey echoes Reck and Sikkink's observation about the importance of NGOs in
providing information to the United Nations. According to Korey, 80 to 90 percent of the
information submitted to U.N. special rapporteurs comes from NGOs, and Amnesty is by
far "the principal supplier of documentation" (2001, p. 260).
As scholar Claude Welch has pointed out, Amnesty theoretically promotes a full
range of human rights in close to 200 countries or territories, but its research and annual
reports concentrate on the rights mentioned in its mandate (Korey, 2001, p. 92). The
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mandate identified in Amnesty's statute is the 1) promotion of, and adherence to the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other internationally recognized human
rights instruments 2) opposition to violation of the right to freedom of opinion,
expression of these opinions, and freedom from discrimination 3) release of prisoners of
conscience 4) fair and speedy trials for political prisoners and 5) an end to the death
penalty, torture, and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading punishment for all prisoners (92).
The nonpartisan, legally focused human rights research which has placed Amnesty at the
center of its strategy is carried out at its London-based International Secretariat, which
often sends fact-finding missions to the places where human rights violations are being
committed. Its volunteer-based groups focus primarily on letter-writing campaigns and
support for urgent action appeals.
Human Rights Watch is similarly large and influential. Welch has remarked that
the U.S.-based organization has "grown in more than 20 years to extraordinary
prominence among NGOs, especially in the United States" (2001, p. 14). Welch points
out that both Amnesty and Human Rights Watch are "classic" organizations among the
top human rights INGOs. While not the only ones, they have "records of
accomplishment worthy of close attention" (13). Like Amnesty, Human Rights Watch
enjoys a significant budget. In 1998, Amnesty's annual budget equaled more than $32
million and Human Rights Watch's budget equaled more than $14 million.
Similar to Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch focuses its work on
careful research of human rights violations. It uses this documentation to lobby the U.S.
government, as well as other governments and IGOs. According to Welch, even though
Human Rights Watch does not have the large popular base that Amnesty has, it has
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managed to be a very effective force "in large part because of its effective, focused
research, its expansion into new areas, its media savvy, and its major roles in several
NGO coalitions" (Welch, 2001,

p.101).

For example, Human Rights Watch has

participated in coalitions with other NGOs to advocate for establishing tribunals for the
former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, creating an international criminal court, and banning
land mines (Welch, p. 101).
Human Rights Watch considers its mandate to watch for the protection of
universal civil and political rights as embodied in international law and treaties. It has
gradually turned its attention to "second-generation" rights, such as economic, social, and
cultural rights, but continues to place emphasis on "first-generation" rights, which are
civil and political rights.
Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch are, therefore, a critical part of
the transnational human rights advocacy network. Focusing on these two network actors
will make it possible to trace their influence and discern the results they achieved.
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III: METHODOLOGY
As scholar Morton Winston has noted, for many years political realists have dismissed
the influence that non-state actors could have on the behavior of states, which were

thought to act only in pursuit of their own national interests. Viewed from this
perspective, NGOs such as Amnesty and Human Rights Watch are at best "gadflies,"
irritating states with "stinging criticisms of their human rights practices" but powerless to
change state behavior or policy (Winston, 2001, p. 26).
One of the reasons why it is important to focus on the genocide's media coverage
- apart from the fact that strategically, the media is key to the work of advocacy NGOs -

is because it narrows down the universe of Human Rights Watch and Amnesty output
during the genocide and facilitates the discovery of a line of influence between their
output and the media. This study, therefore, will focus on three elite Western newspapers
- The Washington Post, The New York Times, and The Guardian- because of their 1)

generally recognized position of distinction and influence among elite media and 2)
geographical location in world centers and proximity to the opinion makers and elites in
their respective countries. The Washington Post is important to the Washington, D.C.
community, while The New York Times is geographically close to the headquarters of the
United Nations and other world media in New York, and influential on a national scale.
In the UK, The Guardianwas chosen because it is widely considered to rank among the
top five "quality broadsheets," or quality daily newspapers in the United Kingdom, and
its records from the time period were accessible. The Guardian dates back to 1821 and
has long been an influential newspaper in the UK and Europe. Morton Winston has also
noted that NGOs tend to engage print media more than other types (such as television or
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radio), which is another reason for focusing on these outlets (Winston, 2001, p. 38).
Looking at the media coverage of the Rwanda genocide will enable a better
understanding of whether these two NGOs were able to create an issue. Keck and
Sikkink have noted that the first stage of transnational advocacy network is creating and

setting the agenda for policymakers. Thomas Risse has also noted that the first stage of
transnational civil society influence is debating a state's norm denial. The media
coverage is significant, then, because it will indicate whether these two advocacy NGOs,
Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, were effective in framing the terms of
the debate. Having the elite media of the world call events in Rwanda "genocide," will in
some way create a discourse with which policymakers will have to contend. Thus,
looking at the media coverage provides a window into issue creation and permits the
tracing of NGO discourse as it evolves as well as media discourse as it evolves.
Keck and Sikkink have also argued that the second stage of network influence is
when transnational advocacy networks have a discursive impact on a state or
intergovernmental organization. Examining the U.S.'s evolving discourse in the media
alongside the NGO discourse will provide a window onto the possible influence of
Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International on what was likely one of their biggest
advocacy targets. The following are the questions I propose to explore in my analysis:

Q1: How did The Washington Post and The New York Times in the U.S., and The
Guardianin the UK, report the Rwanda genocide?
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H1: Even though

major international

media, including these three newspapers, have

already been examined in various studies, taking a close look at them again will help to
establish the themes and messages Human Rights Watch and Amnesty would have had to
address in their media relations efforts to be effective. In keeping with many of the
themes already identified in major Western media by researchers and reporters alike, I
expect to find these three newspapers also confused the facts of the genocide, particularly
in the month of April. Reports are likely to present the massacres as casualties of war,
emphasizing the military campaigns or couching the killings in the language of an armed
conflict between two sides. They are also likely to emphasize the ethnic nature of the
killings in terms of "tribal warfare" or "tribal violence," generalizing the violence to both
sides instead of identifying victims and perpetrators. There will be relatively few
explanations of the killings as a political maneuver or as a deliberate ethnic cleansing
campaign. In addition, I expect to find frequent mentions of Rwanda's history of
violence, which was often offered in explanation of events, but served to obscure the
unique nature of what was occurring and instead communicated a sense that this violence
was common and even inevitable in Rwandese society.

Q2: What messages did NGOs generally, and Amnesty and Human Rights Watch in
particular, communicate in the media April - July 1994? How did they affect the media
discourse?

H2. Because, as Keck and Sikkink have suggested, NGOs are usually the motors of
transnational advocacy networks, I expect NGOs will be the first sources in the media to
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correct the misinformation. They typically work to elicit a response from and set the
agenda for policymakers, so NGOs will likely be among the first sources in the media to
use the word "genocide." They will point to the killings' political and systematic nature
(to offset the belief that they were only ethnic and spontaneous in nature) and they will
identify specific perpetrators. H3. Because Amnesty and Human Rights Watch have a
history of reporting on Rwanda and are large, influential organizations, I expect Amnesty
and Human Rights Watch will play a key role in correcting the misinformation. H4.
Human rights advocacy NGOs will also have qualitatively different messages in the
media than relief organizations. The intent of advocacy organizations is to persuade.
Amnesty's and Human Rights Watch's efforts, therefore, will be aimed at identifying the
perpetrators, whereas organizations such as The International Committee of the Red
Cross and Medecins Sans Frontieres, which are focused on relief, will want to preserve
their political neutrality in conflict zones and will be seen to report statistics or facts but
not political explanations.

Q3. How did the U.S. government's discourse on Rwanda change during this four-month

period?

H5. The U.S. government was reluctant to become embroiled in what it perceived to be a
distant, indigenous conflict that did not threaten any vital American interests. Many
different sources, including John Shattuck, who was U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for
Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs at the time, have noted the Clinton
Administration's dread of experiencing a repeat performance of the 1993 Somalia
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"fiasco." For this reason, the government will likely want to paint the conflict as a civil
war and avoid use of the term "genocide." I expect to find, however, increasing
submission to the "genocide" discourse.
Much of the genocide occurred from April 7, 1994, the day after President
Habyarimana's airplane was shot down, to July 18, 1994, when the Tutsi-led rebel forces
of the Rwandan Patriotic Front declared a cease-fire after winning the civil war against
the interim Hutu-government. Using the archives accessible through Lexis Nexis, a
content analysis of these periodicals from this time period will yield insight into two
aspects of Keck and Sikkink's typology of tactics- the organizations' use of information
politics to set agendas and influence discourse.
Articles through the end of July will be included because they will allow a monthto-month comparison and will provide a picture of the overall arch of the coverage. Not
all articles mentioning Rwanda will be included. Articles mentioning Rwanda only once
or those primarily dedicated to another subject and referencing Rwanda only in passing
will not be included. Letters to the editor from individuals will not be included. Because
the focus of this research is to determine whether there was a media bias or
misrepresentation at play, readers' comments and impressions are not relevant to the
study. Letters to the editor from nongovernmental organizations, however, are relevant
because in many cases they directly challenge the media discourse, and the second
research question of this thesis is aimed at exploring their discursive influence over the
media. Stand-alone photos will be treated and counted as articles because they are
typically accompanied by text and are for all intents and purposes "news" items like
articles.
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Several elements will be measured to gain an understanding of the extent and
quality of the coverage. News articles will either be classified as by-lined (attributed to a
reporter or particular author) or not bylined (taken from news agencies or printed as a

brief) as a way of determining the importance each newspaper placed on the subject.
Bylined pieces are generally longer than briefs and stories pulled from the wires because
they are drafted specifically for the paper by its own staff and will therefore be given
more space than a wire story that could also appear in a competitor's pages. While this is
not entirely an unproblematic indicator - there may be other reasons why a newspaper
may choose to pull from wire agencies, such as inadequate resources to report directly
from a country or the unavailability of a staff reporter on a given day - generally pieces
that are not bylined are shorter than bylined pieces. A second category is the number of
front-page stories vs. stories on the inside pages of the newspaper since placement will
affect the exposure a news item receives as well as perceptions about its importance as it
relates to other news of the moment. Headlines will also be analyzed closely to
determine the themes on which the media focuses, and both specific references to
killings/massacres and general allusions to death will be counted every time they appear
in headlines as a way of determining how much importance these outlets place on the
genocide aspect of the conflict as opposed to other angles. The number of opinioneditorials produced by the editorial board of each newspaper will also be counted because
typically, an issue will receive greater commentary/coverage from the editorial staff if it
is perceived to be important.

33

IV: RESULTS
Critical Analysis of the Media Coverage: An Overview
One of the primary goals of the critical analysis of the media coverage was to discover
how these major dailies covered the genocide. With so many charges laid against them
but only a small number of empirical studies carried out to analyze the coverage, it was
important first to establish if there were, in fact, any visible gaps or distortions in their

coverage. A total of 542 articles/photos were analyzed. The breakdown for the fourmonth period by newspaper is as follows: The Guardian, 163 articles; The Washington
Post, 162 articles; and The New York Times, 217 articles.
Definite patterns in all three newspapers emerged. Most of the stories in all three
papers were bylined pieces, which meant that all considered it an important enough issue
to dedicate their own staff or, alternately, to accept contributed, bylined articles and
commentary pieces on the issue. Because bylined stories are also generally longer, it also
shows a willingness to spare precious column inches to the issue. (That these media were
able to dedicate staff to report on these events is also a reflection of their caliber.) All
three newspapers showed increased coverage in the second month, a dip in coverage in
the third, and a sharp spike in the fourth month. All three also devoted some front-page
coverage to the issue, although this varied greatly by paper, and all three wrote about the
events in Rwanda in their editorial column.
April

May

June

July

The Guardian
The Washington Post

28
34

42
37

33
28

60
64

The New York Times

43

56

41

76

Table 1. Total number of articles and stand-alone photos devoted to Rwanda in The Guardian,The New
York Times, and The Washington Post by month.
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Breakdown

of Articles byPaper

In the month of April 1994, The Guardianpublished 28 stories on the conflict in
Rwanda, Of these, the majority (19) were by-lined pieces written by the newspaper's
own staff, two of whom were based in Africa and reporting in or near Kigali. Four
stories appeared on the front page. Of all the headlines relating to Rwanda that month, 13
alluded to death and nine specifically mentioned killings/slaughter. (Some headlines used
direct words such as "killings," "massacres," "slaughter" and "atrocities" and other only
alluded to fatalities with more indirect words, such as "horrors," which does not connote
the concept of mass slayings as clearly.) In sum, 46% of the newspaper's coverage of the
issue, or almost half, showcased the killings/fatalities aspect of the issue as the leading
news. Of the four stories that appeared on the front-page, two made reference to the
killings in the headlines.
In May, coverage increased considerably, and The Guardianpublished 42 stories
on Rwanda. Thirty of these stories were bylined and 10 were not, showing the paper
once again dedicating considerable resources to the issue and only occasionally
supplementing its own coverage with stories pulled from news agencies. The newspaper
also published one Letter to the Editor from Amnesty International, and one opinion
editorial on Rwanda from the editorial board. None of the stories were published on the
front page. Most were published either in the Foreign section or the Features section. Of
all 42 headlines, 12 specifically made mention of killings or massacres and an additional
five alluded to death, totaling 17 headlines (39%) that privileged the fatalities of the
conflict over other themes. The remaining headlines reported on issues such as the U.N.'s
reactions, the rebels, the war aspect of the conflict, etc.
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In June, coverage waned, as The Guardianpublished 33 stories on Rwanda.
Again, most of the stories were bylined. The newspaper's editorial board also published
two opinion- editorials, one titled, "Rwanda is Waiting" and the second titled, "The
French in Rwanda." Presence on the front-page remained minimal. Only one story made
it to the front page; it was titled, "French Foreign Legion Rolls into Rwanda." The most
prevalent theme appearing in the headlines was France's decision to intervene

unilaterally in Rwanda. This issue was featured in 12 headlines. Eight (24%) of the total
33 articles mentioned the killings and massacres in the headlines. Other issues in the
headlines included the U.N.'s actions and the war aspect of the situation.
In July, The Guardianpublished 60 stories on Rwanda, an increase of coverage
owed to the refugee crisis. (Mostly Hutu refugees fleeing the advance of the RPF
gathered in the thousands in neighboring countries.) Of these, 45 were bylined and 8
were not, showing a fairly consistent proportion. There were four letters to the editor
from nongovernmental organizations and two opinion-editorials from the newspaper's
editorial board. Both opinion-editorials, titled "Going Wrong in Rwanda" and "Hell of
Reproach that is Goma" were focused on the refugee situation in Zaire, Goma. After a
near-absence on the front page, six stories were included in July on the front page, one of
which was on France's role in Rwanda and the rest were on the refugee situation in Zaire.
Of all 60 headlines, only six headlines (10%) were about the killings/massacres. The
most prevalent issue in the headlines was the refugee situation in Zaire (which was
featured in 29 headlines). The second most prevalent was France's intervention in
Rwanda (which dominated nine headlines).
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One of the most notable aspects of this initial analysis of The Guardian's
coverage is that the paper so quickly and extensively narrowed in on the massacres with
46%, or almost half of its headlines in the first month, devoted to the killings. Another
salient aspect, however, is that in the second month, even as the killings raged on, none of
the stories appeared on the front page. Instead, they consistently appeared in the Features
and Foreign pages. Similarly, the editorial team published only one op-ed in May. It
would seem from this editorial decision that, while the issue rmerited coverage within the
realm of world news, it was never considered of urgent enough interest to the British
people to rival other news items that for a full month made front-page headlines instead.
In June, this paucity of front-page coverage continued. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the only
story that did make it to the front page of The Guardian during this month was a news
article about the French Foreign Legion entering Rwanda. As a neighboring country,
France has long been considered of geopolitical interest to the U.K. - and in this case,
perhaps of closer emotional interest to the British than Rwanda.
Like with all the other media, the refugee situation in Zaire received an amazing
amount of ink in July and captured as many as seven headlines in The Guardian's
previously reticent front page. Why this was so - whether because of easier access to the
story in the camps or because Goma represented a clearly more humanitarian and
therefore less "complicated" situation - is unclear.
In April, The Washington Post published 34 articles on Rwanda. Twenty-five
were by-lined articles, one was a stand-alone photo, and five were wire stories. The
editorial staff published three op-eds, two of which were about how a Rwandan human
rights activist had been pursued and had escaped death at the hands of the Presidential
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Guard, and one which compared Rwanda and Burundi. Of all 34 headlines, 12 headlines
(38%) highlighted the slayings. Seven news items in total made the front page. The table
below lists the front-page headlines, with those referencing the massacres in italics. This
table provides a snapshot of the media discourse:
Date
7 April
9 April

Front-Page Headline
Two African Presidents Killed
Slayings Put Rwanda in Chaos; Clerics, ForeignersAmong Casualties;
Americans to Leave

10

Westerners Begin Fleeing; 170 Americans Leave By Convoy

April
Americans Out of Rwanda; Rebel Army Advances on Bloodied Capital

11

April

13

Flight from Rwanda (photo)

April
14

Rwanda's 'Sad, Sad, Sad' Self-Immolation; Free-for-All Slaughter Continues Among Tribes,
April
Rebels, Army, and Roving Gangs
22
Death Toll in Rwanda is Said to Top 100,000
Table 2. The front-page headlines on Rwanda in April 1994 in The Washington Post.

Headlines referencing the killings have been italicized. The first front-page mention of
the large death toll only came on 22 April, two-and-a-half weeks after the start of the
slaughter.
In May, the coverage in The Washington Post increased slightly to 37 news items.
Three were photos, 22 were bylined pieces, and eight were briefs/wire stories. Two were
op-eds by the newspaper's editorial staff, and two were Letters to the Editor from
Amnesty and Human Rights Watch. Of all 37 news items, seven articles were published
on the front page. Two front-page articles made mention of the killings:
Date
2 May
4 May

Front-Page Headline
Running from Rwanda (photo)
Instant City of Misery in a Lush Land

8May

Witnesses Describe Cold Campaign of Killing in Rwanda;
Leaders Allegedly Sought to Wipe Out Tutsis

15

Rebels Gain Support from Both Sides in Rwandan War

May

23 May

30 May

Rebels Take Key Part of Rwandan City
Rwanda Leaders Flee Rebel Advance; Militant Blamed for Ethnic Bloodletting

Table 3. The front-page headlines on Rwanda in May 1994 in The Washington Post.
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Of all the headlines in the month, six made reference to the killings and an additional four
alluded to bloodshed, totaling 10 headlines (27%) focused on the massacres. The other
headlines were about the refugee situation of Tutsi and Hutu refugees in Tanzania and
other issues, such as a possible ceasefire, the U.N.'s actions, Nelson Mandela's reaction,
etc.
In June, coverage on Rwanda in The Washington Post decreased to its lowest
number yet, when 28 articles/news items were published. Of these, 24 were bylined and
two were not. The paper's editorial staff published two op-eds this month. Of all 28
articles, only three made the front page, and only two of these referenced the killings:
Date
9 June
11 June
27 June
Table 4.

Front-Page Headlines
Rwanda's FinalKilling Ground; Hemmed in by Rebels, Militiamen Press Tribal Slaughter
Administration Sidesteps Genocide Label in Rwanda
Saved by French Troops, Rwandans Thank God; Tutsis Celebrate Mass Under Guard
The front-page headlines on Rwanda in June 1994 in The Washington Post.

Seven headlines of all 28 in June made specific reference to the killings, with words such
as

"Genocide," "Killing Ground," "massacre," "slaughter" and others. The proportion of

headlines focusing on the massacres stayed the same, as the seven stories totaled 25% of
all headlines.
In July, Rwanda coverage in The Washington Post increased markedly. Sixtyfour articles were published on the crisis, 57 of which were bylined pieces and three of
which were opinion-editorials from the paper's editorial staff. Of all 64 articles, an
unprecedented 23 articles (36%) were included on the front page. Of these, 20 were
about the newly forming refugee crisis in Goma, Zaire, where mostly Hutu refugees in
the millions were gathering. Of all 64 articles about Rwanda in July, only five (8%)
focused on the massacres. The majority of the headlines were about the refugee situation.
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Although The Washington Post published more news items than The Guardianon
Rwanda in April, it devoted a smaller share of its headlines to the killings (38% vs. The
Guardian's46%). In May, the proportion of the headlines devoted to the killings
actually shrank to 27%. Considering that more was known this month than in April about
what was occurring, this percentage should have gone up, not down. For some unknown

reason, but in keeping with the patterns of the other newspapers, in June coverage in The
Post fell considerably, with only 28 stories published and again the same proportion, only
25% of all headlines, focused on the massacres.
In July, the number of articles shot up again to 64. Remarkably, 23 Rwanda
stories made it to the front page, although only two were about the slaughters and 20
were about the refugee camps. The editorial staff was also more active than ever,
publishing three opinion editorials on Rwanda - one about France's intervention, and two

about the refugee situation. Clearly from this decision, the refugee situation was
considered to be more newsworthy than the massacres.
Of all three newspapers, The New York Times had the highest coverage in the first
month of the genocide. The Times published a total of 43 news items in April, 29 of
which were bylined stories. Nine were not bylined, two were opinion-editorials, and one
was a Letter to the Editor from Human Rights Watch. Of all 43 headlines in April, only
nine (21%) made reference to or alluded to the mass killings - the smallest proportion of
all three media in April. Interestingly, The Times also gave Rwanda the most front-page
coverage in the first month. Twelve news items (10 stories and two photos) appeared on
the front page. Of these, however, only four made reference to the slaughter. Below is a
list of all 12 front-page headlines, with those alluding to the slayings in italics:
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Front-Page Headline
Date
2 Africa Leaders Die, U.N. Says; Rocket May Have Downed Plane
7 April
8 April
Troops Rampage in Rwanda; DeadSaid to Include Premier
9 April
TerrorConvulses Rwandan Capitalas Tribes Battle
10 April Western Troops Arrive in Rwanda to Aid Foreigners
11 April Strife in Rwanda: American Evacuees Describe HorrorsFaced by Rwandans
12 April Havoc in Rwanda: Victims of Tribal War (photo)
13 April Rwanda Rebels Push into Capital
14 April Anarchy Rules Rwanda's Capital and Drunken Soldiers Roam City
21 April As Shells Fall in Central Africa, Outlook for Rwanda is Bleak
22 April Security Council Votes to Cut Rwanda Peacekeeping Force
25 April Rwandan Refugees DescribeHorrorsAfter a Bloody Trek
30 April U.N. Council Urged to Weigh Action on Saving Rwanda
Table 5. The front-page headlines on Rwanda in April 1994 in The New York Times.

Unlike The Guardian, which cited the massacres in its April front-page headlines, and
The Post, which highlighted the death toll of 100,000 in its front page, the front-page
headlines of The New York Times never mentioned "massacres" or "killings." They also
used words and phrases such as "tribes battle" and "tribal war," making it easy to assume
that a war was underway. The front-page headlines never once mentioned the scale of
the slaughter, either, or cited the death toll.
In May, the coverage increased to a total of 56 articles/news items. Of these, 27
were bylined stories and 12 were not. Two were opinion-editorials from the paper's
editorial staff, and one was a Letter to the Editor from Medecins Sans Frontieres. Frontpage coverage was again high, with 11 news items featured on the front page. Again,
only two of these front-page items alluded to the massacres (with references to "bodies").
The front-page headlines once again showed the paper highlighting other issues, and not
the hundreds of thousands that by this time are known to have been killed. References to
"fighting" continued. Considering that the death toll being cited in May was 200,000, it
is surprising to see no reference to the scale of the carnage on the front-page. In fact,
only seven headlines (13%) of all 56 make reference or allude to the massacres. Table 6
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below lists the 11 front-page headlines, with the headlines alluding to the massacres in
italics:
Date

Front-Page Headline

I May

U.S. Examines Ways to Assist Rwanda Without Troops

2 May

Rwandans Stream into Tanzania

14 May
16 May
17 May
18 May

Security Council Agrees on Plan to Send Peace Force to Rwanda
Fighting Flares in Rwanda's Gruesome War (photo)
U.N. Backs Troops for Rwanda but Terms Bar Any Action Soon
U.S. is Showing a New Caution on U.N. Peacekeeping Missions

19 May

Thousands of Fleeing Rwandans Huddle at Remote Tanzania Site

21 May
Thousands of Rwanda Dead Wash Down to Lake Victoria
25 May
European Leaders Reluctant to Send Troops to Rwanda
26 May
Boutros-Ghali Angrily Condemns All Sides for Not Saving Rwanda
28 May Bodies from Rwanda Cast a Pall on Lakeside Villages in Uganda
Table 6. The front-page headlines on Rwanda in May 1994 in The New York Times.

In June, coverage on Rwanda decreased. The New York Times published 41 news

items on Rwanda in total. Twenty-five were bylined articles, 11 were pulled from the
wires or were not bylined, two were photos, and two were opinion-editorials penned by

the newspaper's editorial board. With the smallest number of front-page coverage so far,
only five stories made the front page:
Date
3 June
10 June
23 June
24 June
27 June

Front-Page Headline
Heart of Rwanda's Darkness: Slaughter at a Rural Church
Rebels in Rwanda Said to Slay 3 Bishops and 10 Other Clerics
France Sending Force to Rwanda to Help Civilians
French Troops Enter Rwanda in Aid Mission
Rwandan Enemies Struggle to Define French Role

Table 7. The front-page headlines on Rwanda in June 1994 in The New York Times.

Of all five front-page headlines, moreover, only two reference the slaughters and neither
one of these convey a sense of the massive scale. Of all 41 headlines in June, nine (22%)
reference the killings. (Three of these nine alone were about the RPF's slaying of a
group of bishops.) In June, then, eighty percent of The Times' coverage did not focus on

the killings.
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In July, the coverage of the massacre declined even further. While The New York
Times published the highest number of articles on Rwanda yet (76 news items in total),
only four headlines (5%) alluded to the massacres. Fifty-nine stories were bylined, four
were opinion editorials and one was a Letter to the Editor from a Human Rights Watch
consultant. Of all 76 articles, 22 were featured on the front page. Of these, however,
only one headline focused on the killings. The majority of the front-page headlines (16)
were focused on the refugee situation in Zaire, seemingly indicating that, like The
Washington Post and The Guardian,the refugee crisis was considered more newsworthy
than the genocide.

Close Reading of Articles
One of the most striking aspects of The Guardian'scoverage is the high percentage of
stories focused on the massacres in the first month. Forty-six percent of the headlines in
April referred to or alluded to the massacres in Rwanda. The Guardian had two reporters
stationed in Rwanda - one, Lindsey Hilsum, was based out of the capital of Kigali, and
another, Mark Huband, was based out of Mulindi, in Northern Rwanda. To some extent,
this may explain why they so quickly reported on the killings. The initial reporting, in
the first couple of days right after the shootdown of the plane carrying the presidents, was
detailed and fairly accurate, although not without flaws. In a story published as early as 8
April, Hilsum identifies the perpetrators of the "carnage" (as the headline calls it) as
troops, Presidential Guards, and gendarmes ("Rwandan PM Killed," 1994). She
attributes the death of the prime minister to these elements (and not to "mobs" as other
media reported it) and discusses the targeting of Tutsi civilians. Her reporting is not
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completely accurate, given that she cites one unidentified Western diplomat explaining
that "various clans are murdering others," but many facts are correct. In an article titled,

"Rebels Poised for Assault on Capital," Guardianreporter Mark Huband, from northern
Rwanda, cites escalating violence throughout the country and describes how the
"Rwandan presidential guard ... sought out and slaughtered opposition politicians,
church people and aid workers from both the Hutu and Tutsi tribes." In other words,
unlike other media that reported the violence in more general terms and attributed the
deaths to "tribal violence," Hilsum and Huband clearly reported the identities of the
perpetrators, even in the first days of the genocide. In fact, as early as 9 April, The
Guardianran an important headline in the front page: "Thousands Massacred in
Rwanda" (Hilsum, 1994). This headline would be sorely missing from both The New
York Times and The Washington Post. What is significant about the headline is that it
emphasized both the large number of dead so early in the genocide and captured the
slaying of civilians by using the word "massacred" (and not other, more vague terms).
The article conveys several pieces of critical information, such as the fact that the killings
were being carried out by the Presidential Guard and possibly also by "bands of lawless
armed youths" and that the minority Tutsis were being targeted. Considering how early it
was in the crisis, it is worth noting that most of this information was correct.
For this reason, it is all the more difficult to understand why the coverage got it so
wrong subsequently. From approximately 10 April onwards, in article after article, The
Guardian described the killings extensively, but hardly ever offered any explanation for
them. Reports also became confusing, describing both the fighting or the civil war aspect
of the conflict, alongside the slaughters, making it difficult for an outsider to comprehend
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the death as separate

from

and not a result of the war. For example, in a story titled,

"French Lead Flight from Rwanda," about the evacuation of foreigners in the early days
of the genocide, Mark Huband leads with a paragraph about the fighting between the
government troops and the rebels of the RPF. "Heavy fighting raged around the
Rwandan capital last night as government troops fought rebels to the west of the city and

French paratroopers escorted the first foreign nationals out of the main airport," writes
Huband. He then immediately follows in the second paragraph with a description of the
killings: "In the centre of Kigali, drunken soldiers and gangs of youths brandishing
machetes manned roadblocks on streets where piles of mutilated corpses lay, casualties of
a four-day tribal bloodbath after the assassination of the president last week." There is no
explanation offered for these piles of mutilated bodies. Instead, Huband goes on to
describe the bursts of mortar, rocket and machine-gun fire preventing U.N. employees
from reaching the airport to evacuate. Several paragraphs later, after describing the
actions being taken by Western governments to evacuate their nationals, he returns to the
issue of civilian casualties. "Burning houses sent palls of smoke across the lush hillsides
around the city as the fighting intensified." By using the word "fighting," as opposed to
words such as "killings" or "slayings," Huband confuses the already confusing situation
with the implication that the civilian casualties were being caused in a two-way form of
war. He also discusses how one relief organization had to pull out its staff because of the
"tribal fighting." Still, unlike other media who downplayed the civilian deaths by
focusing on the civil war aspect of the conflict, Huband describes the killings, making at
least eight references in this article to civilian casualties. He does not, however, provide
an explanation for why the killings are occurring, apart from calling it "tribal fighting"
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and "tribal slaughter." Couched, therefore, in this confusing language of war, the cause
of the massacres is not clear. The same can be seen in an article published on 12 April.

Titled, "U.N. Troops Stand By and Watch Carnage," Huband makes one reference to the
targeting of Tutsis in the third paragraph. The foreign troops who have come into Kigali
to evacuate the Westerners, he writes, "are no more than spectators to the savagery which
aid workers say has seen the massacre of 15,000 people - mainly from the traditionally
dominant Tutsi minority." He continues to explain that the killing started after the
President's plane was downed, and then describes subsequent events: "His presidential
guard and the Hutu-dominated army unleashed a campaign of terror. Opposing them is
the rebel Rwandan Patriotic Front, dominated by Tutsis." While this coverage gets
certain facts right that were not present in the article before, such as the targeting of
Tutsis, by so quickly following the mention of the massacre with the statement that the
Rwandan Patriotic Front is opposing the perpetrators of the killings, the story once again
turns to the military or "fighting" aspect of the conflict, obscuring the killing campaign.
Huband then describes how "the splintering of the city between the RPF and different
sections of the armed forces has perpetuated the anarchy" and paints a picture of chaos
and banditry instead of planned, premeditated killing.
Throughout the month, little explanation is offered for the killings, or they are
repeatedly described within the context of fighting. In a different story by a Guardian
reporter named John Palmer, the misrepresentation is clearer. Palmer mentions the
"ethnic carnage" and the "slaughter" but then goes on to mention that the "overall death
toll as a result of the inter-tribal fighting runs into the tens of thousands" ("Guilty
Brussels," 1994). He also notes that much of the "fighting" in the city appears to have
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been caused by Hutu factions that are opposed to establishing a multi-party democracy
with Tutsis. His use of the term "fighting," while correct for the conflict between the
RPF and the army, confuses the civil war with the massacres, especially when he
attributes the death toll to "inter-tribal fighting." In yet another article titled "New
Government Flees Kigali," published on 13 April, Mark Huband opens with a sentence
describing the military warfare. "Heavy fighting erupted yesterday in the centre of the
Rwandan capital as government troops fought advancing rebels, firing cannons and
mortars from positions in a valley below the city's deserted embassy district." He then
makes reference to the continued "tribal slaughter" and notes that "beside every
checkpoint bodies lay as evidence of the continuing violence." Huband mentions that the
Red Cross had estimated 15,000 people dead, but gives no other explanation for their
death. Instead, the article focuses on other issues, such as the refugees fleeing the city.
Lindsey Hilsum of The Guardian reports with similar vagueness initially. In an
article published on 16 April and titled, "Rwandan Blood Flows as Foreign Forces
Depart," Hilsum opens the story with a description of the civil war, describing the
artillery and mortars exchanged by the government and the rebels. She then mentions the
"thousands of people who have died in an orgy of ethnic violence between the majority
Hutu and minority Tutsi" but does not elaborate further on the motivations for the
killings. She also does not identify the perpetrators, apart from referring to them as
"thugs and soldiers armed with machete and knives" and does not describe the campaign
of targeting Tutsi. In fact, like others, Hilsum describes the crisis as an "anarchic
situation" and goes no further in explaining the massacres. This pattern continues even
in stories not penned by the newspaper, but picked up from the wire agencies. A Reuters
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story from 20 April reports on the shelling of a stadium in Kigali where refugees were
sheltering, but never offers an explanation as to why they were targeted, or that the
refugees were Tutsi ("Rwandan Troops Shell Refugees," 1994). Even in a story titled,
"Killings Soar in Rwanda Anarchy," where the massacres are described in detail, little
explanation is given (Luce, 1994). The Red Cross is quoted describing how a Red Cross
van had been stopped in Kigali and soldiers had killed its patients on the spot. Instead of
offering the motivation for these and other killings, the article simply attributes the
violence to "tribal anarchy." "Hundreds of thousands have probably lost their lives in the
orgy of slaughter which has swept Rwanda over the past fortnight," says the opening line
of the article, which is then followed by the affirmation that "the death rate looks certain
to rise as tribal anarchy intensifies." There is no political explanation or background, and
the article simply closes with a statement that Rwanda's government and the rebels had
agreed to talk about a ceasefire, again placing the unexplained within the context of a
military situation.
Interestingly, the first evidence of a more nuanced reading emerges in a 23 April
story that cites several nongovernmental organizations, including a human rights activist
from Rwanda (Brittain and Luce, "Aid Agencies Condemn," 1994). While factual errors
are still present, including an intervention by the Red Cross that focuses on the "fighting"
aspect of the conflict, Rwandan human rights activist Monique Mujawamariya
emphasizes the planned and systematic aspect of the killing. "'The vast majority of the
slaughter in Rwanda,"' she is quoted as saying," '"wasperpetrated by small bands of
young men who'd been systematically transformed by the regime into killing machines,
and then unleashed upon the population."' Monique Mujawamariya is the first to make
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this assertion in The Guardian. The interahamwe, the trained militias, had never been
named or even identified as an organized group in any of the coverage before now. They
make an appearance again, several days later, in a story written by Lindsey Hilsum about
Burundi. Finally, a detailed and accurate explanation is offered for the events in Rwanda.
"The testimony of refugees [entering Burundi] and the last few foreigners to flee Rwanda
reveal the pattern of the killing," writes Hilsum ("Captains Held," 1994). She then goes
on to describe in detail that government-appointed local officials had been working in
conjunction with the police and military to organize the killings and were directing
extremist militias known as interahamweto kill. Initially, continues Hilsum, both Hutu
and Tutsi were targeted along political lines, but now the massacres had become purely
ethnic and were aimed against the Tutsis. This information finally emerges two and a
half weeks after the slaughter has started. Although Hilsum does not cite an NGO as the
source of her information, she and Monique Mujawamariya are among the first to offer a
different view.
Other stories start to paint a clearer picture toward the end of April. On 27 April,
The Guardianruns a small brief in the paper quoting a statement from Amnesty
International that claims government and security forces are the ones ordering the killing
in Rwanda and correcting the characterization that portrays the massacres as ethnic
infighting ("News in Brief: 'Non-Ethnic Killings,' 1994). "Genocide" is mentioned for
the first time a few days later, in a story published on 29 April that attributes the use of
the word to an unidentified U.N. official and British nongovernmental organization
Oxfam. The U.N. official is quoted saying the mass butchering of Tutsis "'constitutes a
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systematic attempt to eliminate them"' (Smerdon, "It's Genocide, Says U.N.," 1994).
Oxfam also is quoted saying it fears the Tutsis have been the victims of genocide.
Despite this declaration, misrepresentations continue throughout the month of
May and June. For example, a story published on 13 May, titled, "U.N.'s Rwanda Crisis:
'Both Parties... Will Fight to the End," repeats some of the same previous patterns
(Huband, 1994). Reporter Mark Huband again opens the article with a description of the
military campaign: "Rocket fire shattered several hours of relative calm in the Rwandan
capital last night as rebel forces launched missiles and heavy mortars at government
troops who were pinned down on three sides of the city." He then goes on to describe
how small groups of civilians who had survived "a month of slaughter" wandered
through the heavily patrolled streets and how there were few injured in the hospitals
because most people were dead. But Huband never attempts an explanation for the
killings, perhaps assuming at this point that previous reports had already explained the
massacres. Instead, as he closes his article, he quotes a Red Cross official who says,
"'Both parties are so desperate that they will fight to the end,"' once again placing the
situation within the context of mutual warfare. Similarly, in a brief from Reuters
published on 14 May, a death toll of 500,000 is given for the first time in The Guardian,
but the deaths are attributed to "Rwanda's conflict" and to "fighting" while the Red
Cross's hospital in Kigali is said to house the sick and "war wounded" ("Up to 500,000,"
1994). Also, even as it cites a statement issued by Oxfam on May 3 comparing the
carnage of Rwanda to the "killing fields of Cambodia," the editorial board issues an
article debating whether the U.N. should let "the factions fight it out alone" ("The Orphan
of Africa," 1994). The op-ed argues that "glum pragmatism dictates that there is precious
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little the international community can do to stem the fighting in Rwanda at this stage." It
mentions that Rwanda and Burundi have been "in a simmering state of civil war since

1962," presumably to explain that this most recent conflict is an extension of that war,
and it warns about the danger of the "fighting in Rwanda" spreading to the northwestern
region of the country. Once again, the language of war confuses the issue.
Nevertheless, mentions of "genocide" increasingly begin to filter through in May
and June. For example, in a 5 May story about the Hutu and Tutsi refugees sheltering in
Burundi, Lindsey Hilsum uses "genocide" for the first time in her coverage ("Refugees
from Terror," 1994). "Now the Burundian Tutsis have been joined by Rwandan Tutsis,
fleeing genocide in their country." On May 18, Human Rights Watch is quoted in a story
about the U.N.'s decision to use a phased approach to sending an intervention force to
Rwanda. "'We need prompt action in the face of genocide in Rwanda,"' HRW Rwanda
expert Alison DesForges is quoted as saying (Elliott, "Fury Greets U.S.," 1994).
Other articles also begin appearing offering a more nuanced explanation of the
violence, focusing on its planned nature. One article titled "Rwanda: Blurred Roots of
Conflict," argues that the slaughter was politically and not ethnically motivated and that
the interim government was implicated in the massacres (Bright, 1994). The human
rights NGO, African Rights, is quoted in the article saying that tribal representations of
the situation in Rwanda were misleading because Tutsi and Hutu were not originally
tribes, but socioeconomic classes. African Rights also asserts that the war was being
used to justify the massacre of unarmed civilians. Similarly, a story published on 3 May
titled, "Blood Brothers," explains that the killings were political in nature and were meant
to wipe out political opposition (Huband, Lorch and Richburg, 1994). (Interestingly, the
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article attributes this claim to "human rights groups," although it does not identify which
ones.) A Letter to the Editor from Amnesty International published on 6 May challenges
The Guardian'srepresentation of the situation as inter-ethnic fighting in its 4 May
opinion-editorial, and instead describes it as an "orchestrated campaign to deprive the
Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) and all political parties opposed to the government, of
any supporters or sympathizers" ("Action to End Rwanda Killing," 1994). Likewise, in a
story from 30 May, Mark Huband interviews interahamwe members and reports that their
admissions confirmed "widespread claims that the bloodshed was planned before the
president's death" ("'I Killed My Brother,"' 1994).
Perhaps the most striking turnaround in The Guardian'sofficial discourse occurs
when the editorial staff publishes another opinion-editorial in June, and this time
explicitly uses the word "genocide," marking a complete shift from its previous vague
use of the word "fighting." Unlike its first hesitation to get involved, the article calls
strongly for U.N. intervention, and, citing Human Rights Watch, unequivocally identifies
the situation: "Genocide, as Human Rights Watch/Africa says in its latest report, must be
called by its rightful name" ("Rwanda is Waiting," 1994). Also in May and June, the
word "genocide" begins to appear in other contexts, as other sources in the press begin
using it. For example, the President of Uganda, Yoweri Museveni, is cited twice using
the word "genocide." The first time, in an article published 6 May titled, "Ugandan
Leader Urges Foreign Intervention; Genocide Not Part of Internal Affairs," Museveni
becomes the first African president to call the killings "genocide" and explains that it is
being used as an instrument to eliminate the opposition (Huband, 1994). He is also cited
a second time on 10 June calling it a genocide ("Troops to Go to Rwanda," 1994).
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Similarly, Zimbabwe President Robert Mugabe is cited in a 4 June article condemning
the genocide. On June 22, The Guardianalso publishes an article titled, "Militiaman
Claims France Trained Rwanda's Killers: It Was Genocide he was Ordered to Carry Out"
(Huband, 1994). The table below outlines the arguments offered in The Guardian's
coverage for the violence and killing. Compiling these explanations is helpful in
understanding who introduced them and how they evolved.
Date
13
April

Argument
Much of the fighting appears to have been among Hutu factions
which are either for or against... democracy with the Tutsi

opposition.
23
April

26
April
27
April

"The vast majority of the slaughter was perpetrated by small
bands of young men who had been systematically turned into
killing machines by the regime and then unleashed upon the
population."
Local government officials were working in conjunction with the
police and the military to carry out the slaughter.
Government and security forces are ordering the killings; they are
political and not just ethnic in nature.

Source Cited
No source is cited.
Explanation offered by
reporter John Palmer.
Monique Mujamawariya,
Rwanda human rights activist
who worked in conjunction
with HRW
"Testimony of refugees and
foreigners"
Amnesty International

29
April

A genocide of the Tutsis is taking place.

Unidentified U.N. Official
and Oxfam

3
May
5
May
5
May

Hutu hardliners in military and militias carried out revenge
killings of Tutsis and killed moderates in the government.
It is "genocide."

"human rights groups"

"Now the Burundian Tutsis have been joined by the Rwandan
Tutsis, fleeing genocide in their country."

6
May
6

Killings are not ethnic in-fighting. They are part of an
orchestrated campaign to deprive the opposition of its supporters.
This is a "genocide to eliminate the opposition."

RPF Commander Paul
Kagame
Reporter Lindsey Hilsum uses
the word without attribution
in her story.
Amnesty International (Letter
to the Editor)
President Museveni of

Uganda

May
7

"killing fields of Rwanda are like the killing fields of Cambodia"

Oxfam (quoted in news story)

May
7

"Killing fields of Rwanda"

Oxfam (cited in an opinion-

May
8
May

18

Tribal representations of the situation in Rwanda are misleading
because Tutsi and Hutu were not originally tribes, but
socioeconomic classes. The war is being used to justify the
massacre of unarmed civilians,
"We need prompt action in the face of genocide."

editorial by The Guardian)
African Rights

Human Rights Watch

May
31

"The genocide that occurred - I can't explain it."

Western Nun in Rwanda

May
Table 8. Alternative explanations for the violence (countering stereotypical representations of "tribal
savagery" and "tribal warfare") offered in The Guardianin April and May 1994
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Table 8 traces explanations offered to explain the violence in Rwanda in April
and May. These were explanations different from the vague "tribal conflict" or
"centuries-old feud" that were used by way of explanation but did not really identify
perpetrators and victims or offer a more thorough account of the reasons for the killings.

The table shows the progression of the arguments, which first began claiming that it was
an orchestrated or systematic approach. (It is worth noting that the first "political"

explanation, which was offered by reporter John Palmer claiming that Hutu factions were
fighting with each other over issues of democracy, was only mentioned in passing as one
possible explanation and not expanded further.) The word "genocide" was then
introduced for the first time in a 29 April article and attributed to an unidentified U.N.
official and to British NGO, Oxfam, both of whom are quoted calling the mass killings
"genocide."

Of all 16 interventions listed in the table, nine were attributed in the media

to human rights organizations or activists. In June and July, these explanations became
widely cited and reproduced (they were too numerous to include in the table). The word
"genocide" also appeared much more frequently. In June, "genocide" was used in 12
articles. In July, "genocide" appeared in 20 articles. In sum, more factually accurate and
detailed explanations proliferated in April and May, from six offered in April, to ten
offered in May, to numerous and widespread appearances in June and July. The word
"genocide" also gradually gained currency. In April, it appeared only in one article. In
May, it appeared in five articles. In June, "genocide" was used in 12 articles, and in July,
it was used in 20 articles.
Human rights groups seemed to have played an important role in introducing this
discourse, given that nine of the sixteen interventions cited in the table were attributed to
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human rights activists. Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International also appear to
play a role, given that the first mention of the killings' systematic nature was attributed to

Monique Mujawamariya, a Rwandan activist who was working with HRW at the time,
and Amnesty was quoted on 23 April discussing the political motivation for the killings.
In total, Amnesty was cited on three occasions in the four-month period; Human Rights
Watch was cited on two occasions. In Amnesty's interventions, the organization
emphasized the killings' political nature, and in HRW's interventions, the organization
emphasized its nature as genocide. Although these interventions were few compared to

other NGOs, such as Oxfam, which appeared in 15 articles throughout the four-month
period, it is likely that they were influential, because their intervention preceded the
proliferation of the "genocide" explanation. The Guardian'seditorial board, for example,
cites HRW in one of its editorial pieces on 10 June when it states that "genocide, as
Human Rights Watch/Africa Watch says, must be called by its rightful name."
Themes similar to those that appeared in The Guardianwere also present in The
New York Times, although the initial coverage of Rwanda in The Times was less accurate.
The conflict's characterization as "fighting" was more pronounced in The Times than in
The Guardian. While The Guardianreported in confusing terms and initially offered few
explanations for the violence, The New York Times often attributed the deaths specifically
to "fighting" and not to the deliberate slaying of civilians.
Similar to The Guardian,in the first couple of days, coverage was fairly detailed
and not entirely inaccurate. Even though the first couple of articles also described the
scene in terms of anarchy and chaos (as The Guardianhad done), the perpetrators were at
least identified, even if incompletely. "...Disparate army and police forces went on a
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rampage," opens on 8 April article (Schmidt, "Troops Rampage," 1994). It goes on to
describe young men with machetes roaming the street, and attributes the bulk of the
violence to the Presidential Guard. While we know now that the militias were not just
roaming in anarchic lawlessness, there is throughout the article at least a sense that

certain groups or individuals are being victimized. This becomes less apparent in the
coverage during the rest of the month. In a story published 9 April titled, "Terror
Convulses Rwandan Capital as Tribes Battle," the violence is portrayed as mutual:
"Rival tribal factions waged vicious street battles Friday for control of the city,
reports from Rwanda said. The death toll of civilians, Government ministers, and
soldiers - including at least 10 United Nations peacekeeping troops - was
estimated to be in the thousands" (Schmidt, 1994).
The article uses the word "fighting" to describe the violence three more times, and uses
"warring factions" in another instance. The headline also describes tribes "battling."
Even in articles where the prominent role of the Presidential Guard in the killings is
mentioned, the conflict is still portrayed as one of mutual warfare. For example, in an
article titled "Two Presidents Die: Peace Talks a Casualty of Tribal War in Rwandan
Capital," the leading sentence notes the presidents' plane crash "touched off bloody
clashes between tribal factions" and immediately follows this sentence with an estimated
death toll "in the thousands" (Lewis, 1994). It describes the "brutal street fighting" and
notes that Burundi suffered from similar "warfare between Tutsi and Hutu factions." The
leading sentence of another story, one published 10 April, shows a similar pattern: "Red
Cross officials in Kigali said the death toll from the fighting ... has risen steadily and
dramatically since Wednesday" (McFadden, "Western Troops," 1994). The word
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"fighting" is repeated four more times throughout to refer to the violence. "The United
Nations force," reports the article, "has been confined to barracks since 10 Belgians were
killed early in the fighting trying to protect the Prime Minister, who was also slain" (my
emphasis). This representation appears consistently throughout the first two weeks.
"There were major developments yesterday as fighting continued in Rwanda," reports
one 10 April article ("Rwanda Update," 1994). Another article published on 11 April,
titled, "Strife in Rwanda: Deaths in Rwanda Fighting Said to be 20,000 or More,"
appears to attribute the thousands dead to mutual warfare: "As fighting between rival
tribal factions in neighboring Rwanda appeared to slacken today, relief workers in Kigali,
the capital, estimated the death toll from four days of ethnic warfare and reprisal killings
at more than 20,000" (Schmidt, 1994). This first sentence makes a rare mention of
"reprisal killings," but subsequent paragraphs describe "the carnage the Rwandans have
inflicted upon one another" and the "warring Hutu and Tutsi tribal factions." (Only in the
18th paragraph is there one mention of soldiers and guards who had supported the downed
president taking to the streets and "killing Tutsis and their supporters and fighting with
Tutsi-backed rebels." In a very long story, and buried in the middle, this one distinction
between the two types of violence, is too short and too quickly abandoned.) This
prevalent (mis)representation is perhaps most clearly seen in the writings of the paper's
editorial board itself. A 10 April opinion-editorial acknowledges the "full-scale
massacre" and the "orgy of slaughter," but it also describes the situation as "a civil war
between the majority Hutu and the minority Tutsi tribes" and asks whether the world
should not "stand aside if belligerents cannot agree" ("Double Tragedy in Africa," 1994).
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A distinction between the mass killings and warfare begins to emerge in an article
on 15 April titled, "U.N. in Rwanda Says It is Powerless to Halt the Violence" (Lorch,
1994). While the article mentions "fighting" eight times, and does not attribute it
specifically to the warfare between the RPF and the government army, it also notes that
"reports of mass killings" have filtered out to the public, and describes the massacres four

times. The article still offers no explanation for the massacre of civilians and
interchanges discussion of the fighting with descriptions of the killings, making it
difficult for the reader to comprehend the two as separate events. It also only seems to
attempt an explanation in the following paragraph: "[Habyarimana's] death set off a
centuries-old tribal hatred between the minority Tutsi ethnic group and the majority

Hutus. Since then, tens of thousands of Rwandans have been killed, most of them in
massacres."

In other words, civilians were being targeted for ethnic reasons, and in

addition to that, there was "fighting" between two armies. While this was true, the
"centuries-old" rationale serves to obscure the planned nature of the genocide by
portraying it as the spontaneous eruption of tribal violence.

Another article, published 15 April, also cites the "centuries-old feud" between
the two tribes (Sciolino, "For West," 1994). In this instance, the massacres are clearly
described, but there is no explanation of the specific targeting of Tutsis. Instead, the
article explains that "tens of thousands of people are estimated to have died in a week of
fighting rooted in the centuries-old feud between Rwanda's majority Hutu and minority
Tutsi ethnic groups." Only in the

1 5 th

paragraph of this 18-paragraph story is there

mention of a massacre of Tutsis, and even then, this mention is not accompanied by an
explanation.
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A clearer representation of the targeting of Tutsis appears in a 17 April article by

reporter William Schmidt ("Once Chosen," 1994). "Uncounted thousands of Tutsis were
slaughtered by Hutu gangs and soldiers," writes Schmidt in the second paragraph.
Human Rights Watch Rwanda expert, Alison DesForges, is quoted in the article,
although she is described as "an African historian." Titled "Once Chosen, Tribal Elites
Now Suffer Consequences," the article delves into the colonial past to look for the roots
of the violence. It describes how the Belgian colonizers had preferred the Tutsis as the
administrative, ruling class of Rwanda. DesForges is cited explaining that the Belgians
had instituted identity cards, which had exacerbated tribal differences. Schmidt explains
that tribal grievances and resentments had been manipulated by local politicians for their
own gain. He argues that Habyarimana had "stoked the fires of ethnic hatred, providing
weapons and direction for tribal gangs" in previous years. DesForges is also cited
explaining that the tribal tensions had been manipulated by ambitious people to their own
advantage. While the article does not make an explicit connection between this political
manipulation and the genocide, it circles around this, coming closer than any previous
attempt at a reason for the killings.
Human Rights Watch appears again in the pages of The New York Times only
three days later, in a letter to the editor published on 20 April ("Don't Write Off," 1994).
Jerri Laber, the Executive Director of Human Rights Watch-Helsinki, counters the
argument that the crisis in Rwanda is the result of age-old tribal hatreds. She points out
that ethnic massacres are "usually the result of political manipulation by governments
seeking to consolidate their power or increase their territory" and calls on the U.N. to
bring the carnage to an end. She also explains that "the initial violence following the
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plane crash in which President Juvenal Habyarimana was killed was politically, not
ethnically based: hard-line members of the government took the opportunity to eliminate
progressive critics, both Hutu and Tutsi."

An opinion-editorial by the editorial board on 23 April shows a shift in discourse.
The opening line acknowledges that "what looks very much like genocide has been
taking place in Rwanda" ("Cold Choices," 1994). Whereas the first op-ed had placed the
presumptive blame for the plane shootdown on the Tutsis, this piece explains that "the
credible suspicion is that they [the presidents] were killed by Hutu hardliners in Rwanda
who oppose reconciliation with the Tutsi people." The article still fails to separate the
massacres from the war, and notes the U.N. force was sent to Rwanda to keep the peace
and not "take sides in a civil war." But at the very least, a political explanation has been
brought into the discourse - something other than just a cultural explanation that fails to
identify those truly responsible and something other than the mutual responsibility of
"civil war."
This awakening to the fact that more is transpiring in Rwanda than just "fighting"
becomes increasingly apparent in the coverage in May, although there are still
recurrences of the previous representations. A 24 April story picked up from Reuters

reports that "100,000 people have been killed in fighting" ("Rebel Officials," 1994), but a
25 April story by New York Times reporter Donatella Lorch describes the survivors of
"the massacres that have killed tens of thousands in Rwanda since the country's President
was killed" ("Rwandan Refugees Describe," 1994). The mass deaths are, therefore,
finally attributed to massacres and not just war, although other flaws in the reporting
continue to a lesser extent.

60

To understand how alternative explanations of the violence enter portrayals in The

New York Times, it is important to trace when reasons other than "tribal passions" or
"ethnic hatred" begin appearing to explain the killings, which is done in Table 9 below.

Date

11

Argument
The killings are "ethnic cleansing."

Source
U.N. Secretary General's Special
Representative in Rwanda Jacques-Rogers

April

Booh Booh
17
April
20
April
23
April
27
April

30

The situation in Rwanda is a manipulation of tribal
tensions for political ambitions (i.e., it is planned
and not spontaneous among the population).
The crisis in Rwanda is not the result of age-old
tribal hatreds. It is a political manipulation. The
initial violence was aimed at political opponents.
"what looks like genocide" has been taking place in
Rwanda
Massacres are primarily being carried out by
soldiers of the Rwandan army [...] It is "political
and ethnic-related violence by Hutu hardliners,
aimed first at political moderates and then at all
Tutsis."
"campaign of ethnic cleansing"

U.N. High Commissioner of Human Rights

"genocide"

U.N. Secretary General Boutros Boutros-

Human Rights Watch

Human Rights Watch (Letter to the editor)

New York Times opinion-editorial
"human rights groups, Western diplomats,
and refugees fleeing Rwanda"

April
4

Ghali

May
4

Children were "selected on an ethnic basis to be

May

killed."

5
May
5
May
5
May
17

It was a planned campaign.
Habyarimana's party was responsible for violence
in recent years; he had armed his supporters.
It is "not a tribal conflict, but a coldblooded,
ruthless cynical plot."
"The delay of the U.S. in confronting genocide is

May

appalling."

18

The military "has systematically massacred not only
thousands from the minority Tutsi tribe but also
moderate Hutu associated with the Habyarimana
government."

May

International Committee of the Red Cross
David Rawson, U.S. Ambassador to
Rwanda.
Human Rights Watch and Amnesty
International
Human Rights Watch
Human Rights Watch
No source is cited. (New York Times
reporter Donatella Lorch no longer
attributes argument to any particular group
to make the claim, but rather states political
argument as fact.)
Medecins Sans Frontieres (Letter to the
Editor)

Medecins Sans Frontieres exhorts the Security
Council to end "the genocide being perpetrated
against the Tutsi people." MSF also argues that
"ethnic tensions within Rwanda are being
exacerbated to pursue political goals."
Table 9. Alternative explanations for the violence (countering stereotypical representations of "tribal
savagery" and "tribal warfare") offered in The New York Times in April and May 1994.
23
May
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Of all 14 instances in April and May where other explanations, besides the
prevalent argument of "tribal slaughter," "centuries-old hatred," or "anarchy" were given,

NGOs were responsible for at least eight interventions. Table 9 shows that in the initial
coverage, these "alternative" explanations were attributed to their source, but in later
coverage, such as in the 18 May story by a New York Times reporter, the claims of
systematic slaughter were no longer attributed but rather reported as accepted fact.
Between 11 April, then, when the first mention of "ethnic cleansing" is made and 18
May, when the reporter writes about it without claiming a source, a definite shift has
taken place in the media perception of events. (It is worth nothing that the initial mention
of "ethnic cleasning" was attributed in quotes to UN Special Representative for Rwanda
Jacques Roger Booh-Booh and was only mentioned in passing. It was not explained

further.)
When one examines mentions of the word "genocide," a clear change in discourse
also becomes apparent, as the word becomes more widely adopted. In April, the only
mention of the word "genocide" appears in an opinion-editorial by The New York Times,
where it both acknowledges that genocide is taking place, but wonders whether the world
should intervene "when belligerents cannot agree." In May, there are four mentions of the
word "genocide" - two are attributed to U.N. Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali,
one to Human Rights Watch and one to Medecins Sans Frontieres. In June, there are
seven instances of the word "genocide." Four are mentioned in relation to the Clinton
Administration's reluctance to use the term; one is used by a reporter to describe the
conflict; one is attributed only to "human rights monitors"; and one is attributed to
Boutros-Ghali and the French government. As with Table 9, there is a shift from when
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the word is initially used - mostly attributed to the U.N. and to NGOs - to when it is used
as an accepted fact among the media, to the extent that reporters no longer feel they have
to attribute the claim to anyone and in fact opinion-editorials challenge the U.S.
government for its avoidance of the term. (In the month of July, the word "genocide"

appears four times in The New York Times coverage, diminishing, perhaps, as the focus
turned to the refugee situation.)
Of all the interventions of NGOs in The New York Times, Human Rights Watch /
Africa Watch appears as the most widely cited human rights advocacy organization in
coverage of the period. The most widely cited NGOs were the International Committee
of the Red Cross and Medecins Sans Frontieres, two relief organizations that maintained
a presence in Rwanda throughout the genocide and were frequently quoted describing the
number, state, and condition of the victims. By contrast, Human Rights Watch appeared
in 12 articles throughout the four-month period. While this may seem a small number
compared to the dense volume of coverage, it was the highest number of any single
human rights advocacy organization. The quality of their interventions was also
important, considering that as early as 20 April, Human Rights Watch was pointing to the
political nature of the killings and suggesting it was a political ploy and not simply a
spontaneous eruption of hatred or mutual warfare. In all 12 appearances, Human Rights
Watch was presented as an expert in the politics of Rwanda, which is the single most
distinguishing factor of its interventions versus those of other organizations, especially
ICRC and Medecins Sans Frontieres. Consistently, Human Rights Watch not only
appeared in its capacity as advocate but also as country expert. This emphasis on the
political facts was precisely the counterbalance needed to change the discourse from one
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that offered a cultural explanation (hatred long held between two tribes) to one that
identified the political motivations and instigators behind the genocide. Amnesty
International's presence was much smaller, appearing only once in an article in which it

argued that President Habyarimana had borne special responsibility for the violence in
Rwanda leading up to the genocide, as his party had been known to arm supporters and to
kill known rebel sympathizers. This was an important intervention because it highlighted
a pattern of planned killing, but it was unfortunately, only one intervention.
The Washington Post repeats some of the same themes and flaws as The New
York Times and The Guardianinitially, but the distinction between the killings and the
massacres are much more quickly made. One 11 April article titled, "Rwandan Capital
Awash in Chaos and Corpses" explains only that Rwanda is a country "where the
majority Hutus and minority Tutsis have repeatedly clashed" (Smerdon, 1994). Early in
the coverage, however, a political explanation is offered for the killings, and in the
reports of at least one reporter, Jennifer Parmalee, a distinction quickly emerges between
the killings and the warfare. In an 11 April article, Parmalee reports that the Rwandan
government blamed the Tutsis for firing the rocket that brought down the President's
plane and then "Hutu troops of the Presidential Guard and bands of Hutu youths went on
killing rampages against Tutsis" ("Americans Are Out," 1994). Whereas other stories
might have reverted to references to "fighting" and mutual warfare, Parmalee goes on to
describe how "Rwandans, mostly Tutsi or Hutu sympathizers with the Tutsis, have been
dragged from their homes and offices and shot or hacked to death." In a 10 April story,
she offers a political explanation for the conflict, citing Rwandan opposition parties, who
had released a statement claiming Hutu hardliners in the government and military were
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using Habyarimana's death "as a pretext to hunt down all opponents - especially Tutsis"
("Rebels Advance in Rwanda," 1994). (The Post was, in fact, the only paper of the three
analyzed that cited this statement from Rwandan opposition parties.) In this same article,
Parmalee quotes Alison DesForges of Human Rights Watch, who says, "'At the heart of

this, it was a coup d'etat."' DesForges explains that the top political leaders executed in
the first days of the killing had been those who favored a compromise with the
opposition.
Human Rights Watch makes a very early appearance in the pages of The Post
when the editorial board excerpts an internal memo on 8 April from DesForges to her
colleagues describing how she feared human rights activist Monique Mujawamariya had
been killed in her home by soldiers targeting those who were said to have "'ruined
Habyarimana's reputation"' ("'Take Care of My Childen,"' 1994). An examination of
the various explanations offered by sources quoted in The Post's articles (shown in Table
10) reveals a similar pattern to that which can be seen in The New York Times. Ten of the
20 explanations offered in April and May come from human rights advocacy
organizations. The other half are offered by U.N. personnel, writers for the paper, or the
RPF. Human Rights Watch is responsible for eight of these NGO interventions. It
becomes clear that NGOs are the single largest source of explanations for the violence,
and in The Washington Post, the interventions of Human Rights Watch are particularly
prevalent, especially in the first two months, which are so critical for shaping the
discourse. Also, as in The Guardian, the prevalence of the word "genocide" increases
over time. In April it appears in five articles, in May it appears in five articles, in June it
appears in eight articles, and in July it appears in 13 articles, Table 10 is included below.
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Date

Argument

Source

8

Soldiers were targeting those "said to have ruined Habyarimana's

Human Rights Watch

April
10

reputation."

April

eliminate the Tutsi minority and liquidate politicians not in the

12

This was a coup d'etat by government hardliners.

Human Rights Watch

17

The killings were organized. The plane crash was the pretext and not

Human Rights Watch

April

the reason for the slaughter. Extremists within the government were
using the death of the President as an excuse to eliminate all political

(Letter to the Editor)

Habyarimana's death served as a pretext for the Presidential Guard to

Rwanda Opposition Parties

presidential movement.

A ril

Sopponents, both Hutu and Tutsi.

17

This is one of many "parish pump genocides" in the third world that are

Robert Kaplan (guest writer

April

to The Post)

19

brought about by a failed democratic process. Democracies (according
to this writer) are doomed to fail in societies with low literacy and
unemployment rates.
Human rights workers were being targeted by extremist President

April
22
April

supporters.
This is "absolutely a case of genocide in which a small group of Hutu
extremists are trying to hold on to power by declaring war on the Tutsi

Human Rights Watch

Human Rights Watch

minority."

24
April

26
April
26

"Since December... the hard-core of the army started training civilians
and militia" [... "We put the word 'genocide' on the table... there is
clearly the intention to eliminate the Tutsi as a people... this is not
fighting, it's slaughter."
"It is pure genocide. They are killing family after family after family."

Human Rights Watch and
Rwandan activist Monique
Mujawamariya

"It is systematic, like a genocide."

Kigeli V (former King of
Rwanda, exiled in the U.S.)
ICRC

The militias have been operating in connivance with the military.

RPF

Extremists Hutus, many associated with the government, have
slaughtered thousands of unarmed civilians in a genocide campaign.
"Hutus - in rampaging gangs of youths as well as organized bands of
paramilitary men - launched a bloody campaign of 'ethnic cleansing."'
"What is happening in Rwanda I think on any definition amounts to
genocide."
The February slaying of 40 Tutsis preceding the genocide was "a test
balloon to see if the U.N. was going to react."
"It is genocide which has been committed. More than 200,000 people
have been killed."
"the one unequivocal case of genocide occurring in the world today"

"Human rights groups"

April

27
April

30
April
5

May
8
May
8

May
26
May
27
May
28
May
30
May
31
May

"With good reason Boutros-Ghali calls it genocide"
(Human Rights Watch identifies four members of the government and
military who were the instigators and organizers of the slaughters.)
"The scale of the killings - and the methodical way they were carried
out - suggest nothing less than genocide."

Keith Richburg (Post
reporter)
Acting Legal Counsel of
U.N. Security Council
Human Rights Watch
U.N. Secretary General
Boutros-Ghali
Charles Krauthammer (guest
writer)
Washington Post Editorial
Board
Human Rights Watch
Richard Cohen
(guest writer)

Table 10. Alternative explanations for the violence (countering stereotypical representations of "tribal savagery"
and "tribal warfare") offered in The Washington Post in April and May 1994.
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A closer examination of the interventions of Human Rights Watch shows that
they were cited in 13 articles in The Washington Post. Again, after the

ICRC

and

Medecins Sans Frontieres/Doctors Without Borders, they are the single most cited NGO.
They are the most often cited human rights advocacy organization. (Amnesty
International appears only once in the four-month period, in a letter to the editor decrying

the United States' lack of leadership in Rwanda.) In The Washington Post, Human
Rights Watch appears six times in April, and seven times in May. Their first intervention
is as early as 8 April. On 17 April, only ten days after the start of the killings, Human
Rights Watch Rwanda expert, Alison DesForges, publishes a contributed article in The
Post titled, "The Method in Rwanda's Madness: Politics, Not Tribalism, Is at the Root of
the Bloodletting." This article argues that the plane crash was the pretext, and not the
cause, for the slaughter. It also points to the organized nature of the killings and explains
that extremists within the government were systematically wiping out opponents,
including Hutu leaders of the opposition. Another key intervention is a 24 April article
written by the editorial board after an interview with DesForges of Human Rights Watch
and Monique Mujawamariya ("So that the World," 1994). In this article, DesForges and
Mujawamariya argue that the genocide was planned well in advance, Tutsis were being
targeted, and the killings amounted to "genocide" (Richburg, "Rwandan Leaders Flee,"
1994). Later, in May, Human Rights Watch actually provides the names of four officials
within the Rwandan government and army who they believe are the primary instigators
of the genocide. No other entity cited in the coverage ever supplies this kind of inside
information or makes this claim. Other important interventions include several
discussions about France's arming of Rwanda prior to the genocide, and one article titled,
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"Witnesses Describe Cold Campaign of Killing in Rwanda" that appeared on 8 May in
the front page (Richburg, 1994). In this article, Human Rights Watch once again
emphasizes the Rwandan government's premeditation and planning of the killings. In
sum, four interventions by Human Rights Watch in The Washington Post highlight the

planned nature of the killings, and two additional interventions refer to the killings as
"genocide."

These interventions are especially visible, given the important piece from

the editorial board, the contributed article by DesForges discussing the genocide's
planned character, and the front-page story on the "cold campaign of killing."
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V: DISCUSSION
This study took as its premise the idea that communicating with the media is an integral
part of the work of human rights advocacy NGOs. The organizations themselves have

acknowledged their use of the media to frame issues and set agendas, as Ron, Ramos, and
Rodgers reported in their study, and as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International
explain on their websites. Advocacy NGOs use the media as a platform to reach decision
makers and to influence the public into accepting their interpretation of events and
subsequently pressure policymakers. For this reason, the media coverage of an event can
serve as a tool to discover whether transnational advocacy networks are engaged in issue
creation and have discursive influence.
The systematic, critical analysis of the coverage of the Rwanda genocide in these
three elite newspapers confirmed my hypothesis (Hi) that the media misrepresented the
conflict, especially in its beginning stages. Most of the misrepresentations appeared in
the months of April and May. Because much of the killing occurred in these two months,
the charge that the media might have been partially responsible for the inaction seems to
be founded, although the flaws were more pronounced in some media than others. All
three newspapers emphasized the mutual warfare and civil war aspect of the conflict, at
the expense of revealing a sustained and orchestrated killing campaign against civilians.
The New York Times, in particular, made references to the "fighting" in Rwanda more
frequently in April and May than the other two newspapers, missing the opportunity to
convey the scale of what was clearly the slaughter of civilians. All three also offered
general, misleading explanations for the violence, blaming it only on "tribal hatreds" and
"centuries-old hatreds." The Guardiandedicated the largest proportion of headlines from
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all three newspapers on the massacres in April, but then relegated the coverage of

Rwanda to its inside pages in May, also missing the opportunity to convey the scale of
events by not giving it a sense of urgency for British citizens and Europeans. The
Washington Post was the quickest of all three publications to make the distinction
between the warfare and the massacres, and as early as 9 April described the targeting of
Tutsi civilians in its news stories. Also early in the reporting (beginning 17 April), The
Washington Post began running stories making a political argument for the killings.
Confirming hypothesis two (H2), in all three newspapers, NGOs played an
important role in introducing arguments that countered stereotypical representations of
Africans engaging in "tribal warfare" and highlighted the political motivations
underpinning the genocide. In the case of The Guardian, the intervention of Monique
Mujamawariya - an activist who was collaborating with Human Rights Watch - was the
first source pointing to the killings' premeditated and systematic character. Amnesty
International also made an important intervention in April, releasing a statement that
emphasized the government's and military's role in the killings. British NGO Oxfam
also seems to have played an important role in influencing the discourse of The
Guardian, appearing in the same article that mentioned "genocide" for the first time and
arguing that Tutsis were being targeted as part of genocide. Oxfam was also cited in an
important commentary piece by the editorial board where it finally acknowledged that
genocide was occurring in Rwanda. Oxfam appeared 15 times in The Guardian - the
most of any NGO after relief organizations International Committee of the Red Cross and
Medecins Sans Frontieres. Five times Oxfam appeared in April and May, decrying the
massacres. It also appeared two more times in May - once in connection with the water
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supply for Rwandan refugees and once to decry the UN's resolution reducing the

UNAMIR force. In June, it was cited twice, once welcoming the news of France's
deployment to Rwanda and a second time described as shying away from working with
the French in Rwanda. In July, it was mentioned six times in connection with the refugee
situation.

One surprising finding from the study was that Amnesty International's presence
in all three publications was much smaller than could have been expected given this
organization's size and importance in the human rights field. This finding partially
contradicts hypothesis three (H3), which argued that Human Rights Watch and Amnesty
International would play a key role in establishing a new discourse. Amnesty was cited
only once in The New York Times in a news story by a staff reporter, and only once in
The Washington Post,with a letter to the editor from the head of the USA Chapter
criticizing the United States' lack of leadership in the Rwanda crisis. In The Guardian,
Amnesty was referenced three times in direct relation with the Rwanda crisis and once in
relation to Burundi. While the organization's interventions might have been influential
given its reputation, the low number of its interventions makes it likely that its media
influence was not as great as that of other NGOs who were cited repeatedly in the media,
such as Human Rights Watch, although one also has to wonder whether the number of
interventions is a sufficient criterion to determine influence, when fewer interventions by
an organization with Amnesty's reputation could also be decisive. This lack of media
presence suggests a missed opportunity for Amnesty, which could have done more with
its media relations efforts to raise awareness about the genocide, especially in the early
months when the discourse was in great need of being corrected.

71

Granted, the published coverage of an organization may not completely reflect its
media efforts, given that not all of its press releases and public statements may receive
attention/coverage. However, an organization with the reputation and standing of
Amnesty International can have access to the media if it truly concentrates its efforts on

doing so (as Human Rights Watch appears to have done). An investigation into the press
releases and statements that Amnesty released during this time reveals that, in fact, the
organization only appears to have issued five press releases/public statements in the fourmonth period studied here. (Documents were provided by the Documents Library of
Amnesty's International Secretariat, although they were accompanied by a caveat that the
batch was possibly only partial.)
Human Rights Watch appeared in 12 articles in The New York Times, and in 13
articles in The Washington Post. In both cases, Human Rights Watch was the most
widely cited human rights advocacy organization. By being the first source to offer a
political explanation for the killings, Human Rights Watch blazed a trail in the media
discourse. In The Washington Post, Human Rights Watch made the first statement apart from Rwandese opposition parties, whose interventions may not have been
perceived as objective - that events in Rwanda constituted a coup d'etat by government
hardliners. In The New York Times, Human Rights Watch also made the first argument
that the killings in Rwanda were political, and not just ethnic in nature. This intervention
occurred in a letter to the editor that was published on 20 April. In The Washington Post,
Human Rights Watch also broke ground by being the first source cited in news articles
that called it "genocide." (In The New York Times, the word "genocide" first appeared in
a 23 April opinion editorial by the paper's editorial board.) Throughout its interventions
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in all three newspapers, Human Rights Watch emphasized the planning of the killings,
and this argument was gradually accepted and reported as fact by the media. It also

emphasized the genocide's political character, which was important to counter the
representation of the genocide as a spontaneous, atavistic manifestation of tribal
savagery.

Reporters' own anecdotes about what influenced their reporting while the
genocide was occurring in the spring and summer of 1994 sheds some light about the role
of NGOs. "Looking back through my reports," writes Mark Doyle of the BBC, "it
appears I didn't use the world 'genocide' until 29 April, in a report filed from Nairobi
that noted that the British aid agency Oxfam had described the killing in Rwanda as
'genocide"' (Doyle, 2007, "Reporting the Genocide," para 41). Doyle goes on to explain
that he had been reporting on massacres for some time, but after Oxfam's release, "it
became clear to me what was happening" (Doyle, 2007, "Reporting the Genocide," para
42). Similarly, Anne Chaon, who was working for Agence France Presse at the time,
gives credit to the NGOs for helping to report on events. "Thanks to Human Rights
Watch, Oxfam, Medecins Sans Frontieres and others, the reality of the genocide finally
made its way into the media" (Chaon, 2007, "Who Failed in Rwanda," para 25). In fact,
highlighting the importance of NGOs, Chaon notes that "AFP's [first] use of the term
'genocide' was in the context of a report quoting Human Rights Watch, which had
warned the United Nations (UN) against reducing the extent of its mission in Rwanda"
(Chaon, 2007, "Who Failed in Rwanda," para 24). She adds that "as

journalists, we

probably avoided many errors because of these nongovernmental organizations" (Chaon,
2007, "Who Failed in Rwanda," para 26). Reporter Lindsey Hilsum of The Guardian
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offers a different account that also points to NGOs'

influence.

Hilsum recounts Czech

UN Ambassador Karel Kovanda's explanation that he decided to push the U.N. Security
Council for intervention after reading an opinion-editorial published by Human Rights
Watch in The New York Times. According to Hilsum, Kovanda said, "That article was an

eye-opener, a key to understanding Rwanda" (Hilsum, 2007, "Reporting Rwanda," para
45). He contacted Alison DesForges, and she provided him with additional information.
Another surprising finding from this study was that NGOs were not the only news
source responsible for pointing to the planned aspect of the killings or offering important
information that could have influenced the media discourse. The United Nations was
also active throughout this period, issuing statements and in the case of U.N. Secretary
General Boutros-Ghali, advocating for intervention, especially in late April and
throughout the month of May. In fact, in The Guardian,both Oxfam and the U.N. were
the first to introduce the word "genocide" into the discourse (their interventions appeared
on the same day), and the U.N. was the first body cited calling the killings "genocide" in
The New York Times. Nevertheless, as a group, NGOs were responsible in all three
newspapers for the majority of the interventions that introduced a new discourse into the
coverage.
Two other NGOs who appeared repeatedly in the coverage and played a critical
role in the way the slaughter was portrayed were the International Committee for the Red

Cross and Medecins Sans Frontieres / Doctors Without Borders, the only two relief
organizations that maintained a presence in Rwanda throughout the genocide. It is
important to note, however, that their interventions were substantially different from
those of human rights advocacy organizations such as Human Rights Watch, Amnesty
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International, and Oxfam, confirming hypothesis four (H4). ICRC and MSF limited their
interventions to descriptions of the victims, estimates of the death toll, descriptions of the
types of wounds inflicted, etc. In this sense, their observations were pivotal, because they

reported the types of killings that were taking place, the weapons that were being used,
the scale of the killings on a national basis, etc. Without their interventions, it is likely
that it would have been twice as hard for human rights advocacy organizations to do their
work convincing the outside world of the reality of events inside Rwanda. However,
these organizations tended not to offer political explanations about the reasons why these
killings were taking place or who was behind them. Their interventions were mostly
descriptive. The one exception that stands out is a letter to the editor from Medecins
Sans Frontieres, dated 23 April and published in The New York Times, explaining that
genocide was being perpetrated against the Tutsis and that the extremists in the
governments were trying to wipe out the opposition. This was MSF's most activist
intervention and reflects the organization's more hybrid nature as a relief/human rights
advocacy organization. The Red Cross, a longstanding neutral relief organization,
refrained from making these kinds of assertions.
Confirming hypothesis five (H5), my findings also reveal that the U.S.
government gradually changed its discourse. On 10 June, The New York Times published
an article uncovering how the Clinton Administration had commanded its spokespeople
not to describe the deaths in Rwanda as genocide. The administration had provided
talking points to its officials, instructing them to say only that "acts of genocide may have
occurred." Secretary of State Warren Christopher eventually had to answer accusations
about using this evasive phrase. "'If there is some particular magic in calling it genocide,

75

I have no hesitancy in saying that,"' he finally said in a statement to the press several

days after the June 10 article (Gordon, "U.S. to Supply 60 Vehicles," 1994). On 16 July,
when the administration finally cut ties with the Rwandan government, it cited as its
reason the Rwandan government's involvement in "genocidal massacre" (Bonner, "Trail

of Suffering,"1994). Like the media, then, the government gradually adopted the
genocide discourse.
There is, in fact, possibly no better example of state and non-state actors engaged
in a battle over meaning - or a "framing" battle, as Keck and Sikkink might have called it
- than the contested use of the word "genocide" in the Rwanda debate. The government

avoided using it, while NGOs introduced it and repeated it. According to Keck and
Sikkink, advocacy networks' discursive impact on states is the second stage of network
influence. It would appear from these findings that NGOs were also at least partially
responsible for the U.S. government's discursive change by introducing the concept of
"genocide," pushing for it repeatedly, and correcting the misinformation that might have
depicted the conflict otherwise. It might be too strong a leap of causality to suggest
NGOs were the only reason the administration changed its discourse, but the media
atmosphere - shaped so strongly by the NGOs

-

would certainly appear to have been a

factor. Overall, my findings confirm the pivotal role transnational advocacy networks
and NGOs play in issue creation and discursive change. Despite their use of "soft
power," human rights advocacy organizations have considerable influence. In Rwanda's
case, the world's reaction came too late for most Rwandese. But it is hard to imagine that
it would ever have come at all without the pressure of advocacy NGOs.
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